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I. INTRODUCTION 
At a press conference held on August 23, 1996, just one year 
after initially revealing his plans,l President Clinton announced 
sweeping federal regulations to combat the underage use of 
tobacco products.2 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
subsequently published a lengthy preamble to accompany the 
final regulations, detailing the Agency's assessment of the prob­
lem and responding to numerous public comments to its notice 
of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).3 Characterizing the growing 
use of tobacco products as a "pediatric disease," FDA Commis­
sioner David Kessler previously had vowed to alter the smoking 
habits of the newest generation of tobacco users in order to "rad­
ically reduce the incidence of smoking-related death and dis­
ease."4 
The tobacco regulations deal with both cigarettes and 
smokeless tobacco products, and they focus primarily on the 
advertising, sale, and distribution of these products to children 
and adolescents.5 Among other things, the regulations establish 
1. See Todd S. Purdam, Teenagers and Tobacco: Clinton Proposes Broad Plan 
to Curb Teen-Age Snwking, N_Y_ TIMES, Aug. 11, 1995, at AI; see also 60 Fed. Reg. 
41,314 (1995) (notice of proposed rulemaking); 60 Fed. Reg. 41,453 (1995) (accompa­
nying jurisdictional statement). 
2. See Peter Kilborn, Clinton Approves a Series of Curbs on Cigarette Ads, N.Y. 
TIMEs, Aug. 24, 1996, at 1; Claudia MacLachlan, Tobacco's Road is Snwoth: FDA 
Regs Face Legal Fight, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 9, 1996, at B1. 
3. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,616-18 (1996) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 
897). 
4. Suein L. Hwang et al., FDA Seeks to Mount Attack on Smoking by Minors 
That Could Mean Regulation, WALL ST. J., July 13, 1995, at A3. In the preamble, 
the FDA cites 1994 figures from the Surgeon General's office indicating that more 
than three million American adolescents currently smoke cigarettes and that an 
additional one million adolescent males use smokeless tobacco. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 
44,398, 44,421-22. The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) recently released a state­
by-state compilation of smoking patterns. The report indicates very high rates of 
teenage tobacco use in some parts of the United States. See Dana M. Shelton et al., 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, State Laws on Tobacco Con­
trol-United States, 1995, 44 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., No. SS·6, Nov. 3, 
1995, at 24-25; see also Barnaby J. Feder, Increase in Teen·Age Snwking Sharpest 
Among Black Males, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1996, at A20 (reporting that the CDC's 
latest survey indicated that almost 35% of persons age 17 and under had admitted 
smoking in the previous month as compared with 30% just three years earlier). 
5. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,397-99, 44,422-24. The FDA also published as an 
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a federal mmlDlUm age for the purchase of tobacco products, 
prohibit some vending machine sales, and limit the format and 
content of, as well as the conditions under which minors are 
exposed to, tobacco product advertising.6 The Agency also plans 
to require that the tobacco industry undertake a substantial 
educational program aimed at minors to provide information 
about the harmful consequences of·using tobacco products and to 
counteract the appealing images associated with tobacco use in 
recent advertising campaigns.7 
In originally announcing these initiatives, President Clinton 
had invited Congress to intercede with a legislative response.8 
In fact, Mr. Clinton suggested that Congress would have only 
ninety days to respond if it wished to prevent finalization of the 
regulations.9 The FDA frequently extends comment periods, 
however, and it did so in this case.10 Moreover, before issuing a 
final rule, an agency must consider fuLd prepare responses to all 
material comments received.11 For a relatively simple proposal, 
"annex" a separate document whi~h more fully set Qut its legal arguments for as­
serting jurisdiction over tobacco products. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,619 (1996) (jurisdic­
tional statement); see also id. at 45,274 n.1227 (explaining that the Agency employed 
notice-and-comment rulemaking proc~dures in formulating its jurisdictional. analysis 
even though not required to do so). It is not clear why the FDA proceeded in this 
fashion, unless perhaps it thought that a notice asserting its claim for jurisdiction 
over tobacco products might have some independent significance. 
6. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,396-97 (summarizing the new regulations). Most of 
the restrictions will take effect after one year, except the age limitation will apply in 
six months, while the prohibition on brand-name spqnsorship will not take effect for 
two years. See id. at 44,542-43 (noting that manuf!!cturers also will have two years 
to comply with the registration, listing, and good manufacturing practice require­
ments applicable to all medical devices). 
7. See id. at 44,538, 44,590. 
8. See Teenagers and Tobacco: Excerpts from Clinton News Conference on His 
Tobacco Order, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1995, at A18. 
9. See President's Anti-Smoking Initiative Faces Formidable Challenges, BALT. 
SUN, Aug. 11, 1995, at 14A (noting that Mr. Clinton urged Congress to use the 90­
day comment period to develop comprqmise legislation). 
10. The comment period originally closed on November 9, 1995, but was later 
extended to January 2, 1996. See .60 Fed. Reg. 53,560 (1995). The Agency then 
briefly reopened the comment period in late March. See 61 Fed. Reg. 11,349 (1996); 
61 Fed. Reg. 11,419 (1996); Timothy Noah & Suein L. Hwang, Philip Morris, in 
Voluminous Comment, Denies Manipulating Cigarette Nicotine, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 
1996, at A24. 
11. Guarantees of public participation would be meaningless unless agencies 
honestly considered and responded to significant comments on proposals. See, e.g., 
St. James Hosp. v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1460, 1470 (7th Cir. 1985); Home Box Office, 
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this process might take weeks OJ;' months, while, for more com­
plex and controversial proposals such as the tobacco NPRM, this 
process might take years to complete;12 indeed, some proposals 
are never finalized.13 
In light of the clearly exaggerated urgency of the matter and 
the radical nature of the FDA's proposals, some commentators 
viewed the announcement as no more· than a political gesture, a 
threat made with the hope of forcing Congress' hand.14 In fact, 
the FDA previously had asked Congress for guidance on the 
matter/5 although that had occurred before the mid-term elec­
tions gave the Republican Party a majority in Congress. In the 
past, Congress has been notoriously hesitant to enact legislation 
controlling tobacco products,16 and it did not initially react to 
the proposals, evidently waiting to see if the FDA's threat of 
action was serious.17 
The tobacco industry, itself under siege from various fronts 
Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
12. Cf. M. Elizabeth Magill, Congressional Control Over Agency Rulemaking: The 
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act's Hammer Provisions, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
149, 165-70 (1995) (describing the FDA's failure to meet strict congressional 
deadlines for the issuance of final nutrition labeling regulations). 
13. See, e.g., 56 Fed. Reg. 67,440 (1991) (withdrawing 89 FDA proposals, most of 
which had been pending for more than ten years). 
14. See Claudia MacLachlan, FDA Draws First in Tobacco Wars, NAT'L L.J., 
Aug. 28, 1995, at AI, A21. 
15. See Regulation of Tobacco Products (Part 1): Hearings Before the Subcomm. 
on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d 
Congo 33 (1994) (statement -of David A Kessler, Commissioner of Food and Drugs) 
("On these issues we seek guidance from the Congress."); Anita Manning, Smoking 
Under Fire from the FDA and Others, USA TODAY, Mar. 29, 1994, at 6D. 
16. See Wayne Hearn, Anti-Smoking Group Gives Government Bad Grades, 
AMER. MED. NEWS, Feb. 7, 1994, at 20 (noting that Congress failed to pass almost 
all of the 1,000 tobacco control bills introduced over a 30-year period); infra note 59 
(listing several unenacted bills which would have given the FDA regulatory authority 
over tobacco products). 
17. See Barnaby J. Feder, Big Tobacco Victory Creates Joy and Profit on Wall 
Street, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1996', at D1, D8 ("[A]nalysts expect Congress, as long as 
it is Republican-controlled, to deny the [FDA] the funds it would need to follow 
through."); Timothy Noah, Smoke Under Fire: Controversy Over. Wigand Reflects 
Broader Government War on Tobacco, WAIL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1996, at A12 ("Republi­
cans . • . are poised to press legislation to block an ambitious [FDA] rule, but are 
holding back in hopes that a federal judge strikes it down first."). A number of bills 
were introduced shortly after the FDA announced its proposals. See, e.g., S. 1262, 
104th Congo (1995); S. 1295, 104th Congo (1995); H.R. 2283, 104th Congo (1995); 
H.R. 2414, 104th Congo (1995). 
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over the last few years,t8 took the threat seriously, both in fil­
ing extensive comments with the FDA19 and in launching pre­
emptive judicial challenges to the Agency's assertion of jurisdic­
tion.20 For his part, President Clinton capitalized on the under­
age use of tobacco as a campaign issue-his Republican chal­
lenger, Bob Dole, was sharply criticized for his earlier opposition 
to the initiative.21 
Although the broad public health goals underlying the regu­
lations seem unassailable, there are serious doubts about the 
Agency's assertion of legal authority to regulate tobacco products 
in the manner selected. The FDA's initiative could still force a 
rapid legislative response,22 but this depends in part on how 
18. See, e.g., Noah, supra note 17, at A12 ("[T]he government is waging a war 
of attrition against the tobacco industry. Taking place at both the federal and state 
levels, the war also includes a number of private civil actions . . . . "). Several states 
have filed suit against companies to recover costs associated with health care for 
residents with tobacco-related illnesses. See Jonathan S. Massey, The Florida To· 
bacco Liability Law: Fairy Tale Objectrons to a Reasonable Solution to Florida's 
Medicaid Crisis, 46 FLA. L. REv. 591 (1994); Andrew A. Skolnick, Spate of Lawsuits 
May Finally Find Chink in Tobacco Industry's "Impenetrable Armor,· 273 JAMA 
1080 (1995). 
19. See Noah, supra note 17, at A12 ("Currently, the FDA is reviewing 700,000 
public comments on the rule, more than the agency has ever received on any single 
regulation, the majority of them negative."). On the final day of the comment period, 
the Tobacco Institute and five of the major cigarette manufacturers filed 2,000 pages 
of comments and 45,000 pages of footnotes and other documentation arguing against 
the proposed regulations. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,418 (1996); 61 Fed. Reg. 
44,619, 45,272 (1996) (jurisdictional statement); Timothy Noah, Cigarette Firms 
Challenge FDA's Right to Restrict Minors' Access to Tobacco, WAll. ST. J., Jan. 2, 
1996, at B8. 
20. See, e.g., Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, No. 2:95CV0059 (M.D.N.C. filed Aug. 
10, 1995); see also Barnaby J. Feder, Tobacco Curbs Face Legal Fight, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 24, 1996, at 8 (describing the predicted course of pending lawsuits in the wake 
of the FDA's recent finalization of the regulations). Other questionable FDA decisions 
often are not formally challenged because a company may fear alienating the Agen­
cy. See Allegatrons of FDA Abuses of Authority: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Oversight and Investigatrons of the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Congo (1995). 
21. See Judi Hasson, Debate Centers on Economy, Government Role, USA TODAY, 
Oct. 7, 1996, at 12A ("Clinton charged [in the first Presidential debate] that Dole 
sided with tobacco companies when the administration tried to block cigarette sales 
and advertising to minors."); Timothy Noah, Dole's Remarks on Tobacco Addition 
Leave Him Open to Savage Criticism, WAll. ST. J., July 5, 1996, at A8; Dole Oppos­
es FDA's Steps to Regulate Tobacco Items, WALL ST. J., June 14, 1996, at A16. 
22. Under a recently enacted procedure, Congress gets 60 days after the publica­
tion of a "major" rule to introduce a joint resolution of disapproval, and then it has 
60 session days in which to vote on the resolution under "fast track" procedures 
(which, among other things, substantially limit the opportunity for amendments and 
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persuasive one finds the Agency's assertion that it has the legal 
authority to issue the rules. This Article will critically evaluate 
claims that the FDA has exceeded statutory and constitutional 
limitations on its power. 
Part II focuses on objections to the Agency's claim that it 
can regulate the advertising of tobacco products using the spe­
cial statutory provisions applicable to restricted medical devices. 
The FDA argues that nicotine qualifies as a drug because tobac­
co companies intend that consumers become addicted to nicotine 
containing products. Even if true, the Agency still must justify 
the assertion of authority over products traditionally regulated 
by another agency, and then it must explain the counterintuitive 
classification of tobacco products as medical devices, and also as 
restricted devices, rather than as drugs. 
Part III canvasses some of the apparently unanticipated 
consequences of this device classification, including the possibili­
ty that cigarette manufacturers may enjoy a broader preemption 
defense in tort lawsuits. Finally, Part IV addresses the relative 
strength of some of the various constitutional objections raised 
by the industry, particularly with regard to the advertising re­
strictions and the proposed industry-financed educational cam­
paign. Ultimately, this Article concludes that the FDA regula­
tions exceed the Agency's delegated authority and that the pro­
posed educational campaign contravenes the First Amendment. 
II. STATUTORY OBJECTIONS TO THE REGULATIONS 
During the last quarter of a century, the FDA has been 
notoriously creative in construing its own statutory authority. In 
the early 1970s, high level Agency officials expressed the view 
that the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act)23 
represents a broad "constitution" authorizing the FDA to protect 
the public health by any necessary and proper means, rather 
filibusters). See Contract With America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104­
121, § 251, 110 Stat. 868 (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808). The FDA desig­
nated its new regulation as a "major" rule subject to this procedure. See 61 Fed. 
Reg. at 44,615. Of course, the President ultimately would remain free to veto any 
such resolution of disapproval. 
23. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified 
as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1994». 
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than a limited and precise delegation of Congress' legislative 
power.24 Some might applaud the Agency for its adaptability to 
changing circumstances, but others have credibly accused it of 
overreaching and arbitrariness.25 
Although courts show significant deference to an agency's 
interpretation of its statutory authority,26 they need not coun­
tenance expansive constructions of an agency's regulatory juris­
diction.27 For the most part, the courts have not rebuffed the 
24. See Peter Barton Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation Under the Federal Food, 
Drug and Cosmetic Act, 28 FOOD DRUG COSMo L.J. 177, 178 (1973) ("[T]he Act must 
be regarded as a constitution. . . . The mission of the [FDA] is to implement [its 
fundamental] objectives through the most effective and efficient controls that can be 
devised."); see also United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943) (suggest­
ing that the FD&C Act be treated as "a working instrument of government and not 
merely as a collection of English words"). 
25. See, e.g., 62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 340 U.S. 593, 600 (1951) ("In 
our anxiety to effectuate the congressional purpose of protecting the public, we must 
take care not to extend the scope of the statute beyond the point where Congress 
indicated it would stop."); Southeastern Minerals, Inc. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 758, 767 
(5th Cir. 1980) (criticizing the FDA's "bureaucratic hubris that confuses abuse of 
power with reason"); United States v. Parkinson, 240 F.2d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 1956) 
("The record of the past few decades is replete with examples of the tendency of 
executive agencies to expand their field of operations. A passion and a zeal to 
crusade affects their operations."); H. Thomas Austern, Philosophy of Regulation: A 
Reply to Mr. Hutt, 28 FOOD DRUG COSMo L.J. 189, 191 (1973) (criticizing the sugges­
tion that "a well-motivated administrative agency can legally do what it alone deems 
desirable unless Congress has in advance specifically prohibited it"); James D. 
Poliquin, Comment, The Incremental Development of an Extra-Statutory System of 
Regulation: A Critique of Food and Drug Administration Regulation of Added Poi­
sonous and Deleterious Substances, 33 ME. L. REv. 103, 103 (1981) ("[T]he agency 
has chosen to take advantage of the statute's ambiguity to enhance its regulatory 
powers, often assigning strained interpretations of the statute to advance the 
agency's perceived goals."). 
26. See, e.g., NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 115 S. 
Ct. 810, 813-15 (1995); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to 
Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 980-93 (1992); Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopat­
ed Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpreta­
tions of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 94-103 (1994). 
27. See, e.g., Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex reI. Moore, 487 
U.S. 354, 386 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Our agency deference cases have 
always been limited to statutes the agency was 'entrusted to administer.''') (quoting 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844); Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension 
Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 368 (1986) (rejecting Federal Reserve's interpretation of its 
statutory jurisdiction as including institutions offering NOW accounts); see also 
Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. 
Cm. L. REv. 123, 185-87 (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After 
Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2071, 2097-2101 (1990). 
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FDA's self-serving and generous claims of power. In recently 
promulgating its tobacco regulations, however, the Agency may 
have crossed the line. In doing so, it has diverted scarce resourc­
es and may have unwittingly imperiled its core missions.28 
A Jurisdiction to Regulate Tobacco Products 
The FDA's jurisdiction to regulate cigarettes and smokeless 
tobacco products depends on answers to a couple of questions. 
First, do tobacco products fit within one of the many product 
categories over which the Agency exercises authority? The FDA 
contends that nicotine satisfies the definition of the term "drug" 
because of its addictive effect coupled with evidence of the 
industry's intent that it affect the structure or function of the 
body in this manner.29 Second, even if one accepts the FDA's 
asserted product categorization, did Congress nonetheless mean 
to reserve jurisdiction over tobacco product labeling and adver­
tising for an agency other than the FDA, namely, the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC)? These questions are taken up in turn 
below. 
1. FDA Authority Over Drugs.-Under the FD&C Act, a 
"drug" is any "article[] intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, 
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man ... [or] 
intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of 
man."30 The mere presence of a chemically active substance 
would not satisfy this definition;31 the manufacturer must in­
28. See Benjamin Wittes, Tobacco Lobby Keeps on Smoking, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 
15, 1996, at 1, 5 (describing tobacco industry's congressional lobbying strategy as 
emphasizing the FDA's diversion of resources from other important regulatory 
activities); M-D-D-I REPORTS ("The Gray Sheet"), Jan. 8, 1996, at I&W-3 ("Personnel 
reassignments to the tobacco initiative have filtered down to the FDA Center level, 
with the Commissioner's office pulling at least one staff member from each of the 
agency's centers .... [p]rogress on farther-term device reg[ulation]s could be slowed 
by the tobacco effort."); see also 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,598 (1996) ("FDA projects 
that between 30 to 50 full-time employees (FTE's) will be needed to implement the 
rule."). 
29. The Agency's collateral argument that tobacco products are "medical devices" 
under the Act, which is discussed in Part II.B, infra, depends entirely on its thresh­
old claim that the nicotine delivered by such products qualifies as a drug. 
30. 21 U.S.C. § 32ICgX1XB), (C) (1994). 
31. See Action on Smoking & Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 239-41 (D.C. Cir. 
10 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 48:1:1 
tend that the substance serve a therapeutic purpose or other­
wise affect the structure or function of the body.32 Thus, a 
product's intended use, rather than its formulation, determines 
whether it is a drug, even when the product is introduced into, 
or has some chemical effect upon, the body. The intended use of 
a product typically is determined by its labeling and any other 
promotional claims.33 
In the past, the FDA has asserted jurisdiction over tobacco 
products only when they were accompanied by therapeutic 
claims.34 The Agency also has declined to regulate "smokeless" 
1980) (holding that cigarettes are not drugs simply because they affect the structure 
or function of the body unless tMy were intended to be used for this purpose). 
"[C]onsumers must use the product predominantly-and in fact nearly exclu­
sively-with the appropriate intent before the requisite statutory intent can be 
inferred." Id. at 240; see also FrC v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 108 F. Supp. 
573, 576-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), affd, 203 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1953). 
32. The "structure or any function" definitions of drugs and devices apply only 
to products which literally claim to change the physical structure of the body or to 
alter one or more of its basic functions. See E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. V. Bowen, 870 
F.2d 678, 682-83 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting that "the 'structure or . • . function' def­
inition, unlike the 'disease in man' definition, is relatively narrow, and was not 
intended to encompass all articles that might have some remote physical effect upon 
the body"); United States V. Article .•. "Sudden Change," 409 F.2d 734, 741 (2d 
Cir. 1969) (holding that lotion claiming to create a "face lift" purports to affect the 
structure or function of the body and is therefore a drug); United States V. An Arti­
cle ... "Line Away," 415 F.2d 369, 371-72 (3d Cir. 1969) (same); Orthopedic Equip. 
CO. V. Eutsler, 276 F.2d 455, 459 (4th Cir. 1960) (holding that surgical nail inserted 
into broken bone is a "device" within the meaning of the structure or function 
definition); United States V. 23,. More or Less, Articles, 192 F.2d 308, 309 (2d Cir. 
1951) (holding that phonograph record purporting to induce sleep is a "device" be­
cause sleep is a function of the body). 
33. See, e.g., United States v. Article of Drug ... B-Complex Cholinos Capsules, 
362 F.2d 923, 925-26 (3d Cir. 1966) (radio broadcasts); Nature Food Centres, Inc. V. 
United States, 310 F.2d 67, 70 (lst Cir. 1962) (public lectures); V.E. Irons, lnc. v. 
United States, 244 F.2d 34, 44. (1st Cir. 1957) (oral representations made by autho­
rized sales distributors); United States V. General Nutrition, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 556, 
563-64 (W.D.N.Y. 1986) (same); Hanson V. United States, 417 F. Supp. 30, 35 (D. 
Minn.), affd, 540 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1976); see also 21 C.F.R..§ 201.128 (1996) 
(defining "intended use"). 
34. See United States V. 354 Bulk Cartons ... Trim Reducing-Aid Cigarettes, 
178 F. Supp. 847, 851 (D.N.J. 1959) (holding that cigarettes purporting to reduce 
appetite affect both the structure (body weight) and function (appetite) of the body}; 
United States V. 46 Cartons ... Fairfax Cigarettes, 113 F. Supp. 336, 337 (D.N.J. 
1953) (holding that the FDA could regulate cigarettes as drugs where their labeling 
clearly suggested that they would reduce the risk of colds and other infections); see 
also Nutrilab, Inc. V. Schweiker, 7-13 F.2d. 335, 337-38 (7th Cir. 1983); Bradley V. 
United States, 264 F. 79, 81-82 (5th Cir. 1920); United States V. An Article of 
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cigarettes as drugs. Smokeless cigarettes heat rather than burn 
tobacco and thus deliver nicotine into the body while substan­
tially reducing the production and inhalation of other toxic sub­
stances. After one tobacco company announced the development 
of such a cigarette in 1987, two interested groups formally re­
quested that the FDA classify the product as an "alternative 
nicotine delivery product" subject to regulation as a drug.35 
Because the company soon withdrew the product from the mar­
ket due to poor performance, the FDA declared the issue moot 
and declined to rule on the petitions.36 
Although the FDA has rejected previous requests that it 
regulate all cigarettes as drugs,37 at least absent therapeutic 
claims, this factual conclusion remains open to revision.38 The 
Drug .•• u.s. Fancy Pure Honey, 218 F. Supp. 208, 211 (E.D. Mich. 1963), affd, 
344 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1965); S. REP. No. 73-493, at 2·3 (1934) ("The use to which a 
product is put will determine the category into which it will fall . . • . The manu­
facturer of the article, through his representations in connection with its sale, can 
determine the use to which an article is to be put."). 
35. See PETER BARTON HUTI' & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG LAw 384 
(2d ed. 1991) (describing petitions filed by the American Medical Association and the 
Coalition on Smoking or Health); see also Health Consequences of Smoking: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy 
and Commerce. 100th Congo 163-64 (1988) (statement of Dr. John Slade) (concluding 
that the smokeless cigarette will be "the most addictive form of nicotine ever de­
vised," will attract novice smokers, and "may promote relapse to active nicotine 
dependence"); Michael Waldholz & John Helyar, FDA Feels Heat on Smokeless 
Cigarette, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 1988, at B1. 
36. See HUTI' & MERRILL, supra note 35, at 384. Recently, R.J. Reynolds began 
test marketing a new smokeless cigarette, though amid concerns that the FDA 
might demand pre-market review. See Barnaby J. Feder, Ready to Test New Ciga­
rette, Maker Fears Tough Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8. 1996, at A13; Suein L. Hwang 
& Alix M. Freedman, Smokers May Mistake "Clean" Cigarette for Safe, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 30, 1996. at B1; see also Anthony Flint, Race Is on to Sell Nicotine Products, 
BOSTON GLOBE, July 29, 1996, at Bl. 
37. See, e.g., Action on Smoking & Health, 655 F.2d at 240 (Nicotine stimulates 
the senses, but it does not affect the structure or any function of the body; although 
any article which '"comes into contact with any of the senses may be said to be an 
article intended to affect the functions of the body of man,'" Congress did not intend 
the definition to be read so broadly.) (quoting FTC v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 
108 F. Supp. 573, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), affd, 203 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1953» (internal 
quotation omitted). 
38. See id. at 242 n.10 ("Nothing in this opinion should suggest that the Admin­
istration is irrevocably bound by any long-standing interpretation and representations 
thereof to the legislative branch. An administrative agency is clearly free to revise 
its interpretations. • • . [H]owever, it must provide a reasoned explanation for its 
action."); see also 21 C.F.R. § 10.85(k) (1996); 61 Fed. Reg. 44,619, 45,219-21 (1996) 
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FDA now believes that it has .accumulated sufficient evidence 
proving that manufacturers intend that cigarettes and other 
tobacco products be used to affect the structure or function of 
the body. The Agency takes the position that tobacco products 
are intended to satisfy the cravings of persons addicted to nico­
tine.39 
In reaching this conclusion, the FDA relies in part on exten'­
sive scientific evidence concerning the addictive nature of nico­
tine. The FDA summarizes the scientiqc evidence demonstrating 
the definable chemical effects that nicotine produces in the brain 
of the user, including physiological dependence.4o Further, it 
describes studies documenting symptoms of smoking addiction 
such as continued use despite knowledge of harmful consequenc­
es, withdrawal symptoms .following abstinence, and continued 
use despite repeated attempts to quit.41 The Agency concludes 
that consumers use tobacco products to satisfy addiction, noting 
that between seventy-five and ninety-five percent of frequent 
smokers meet the criteria for addiction established by public 
health organizations.42 
Evidence of addictiveness would not, however, itself suffice 
to support "drug" jurisdiction over tobacco products. In public 
statements, tobacco industry execut~ves have argued that nico­
tine simply improves flavor and does not affect the body of the 
smoker. In a recent congressional hearing, one tobacco industry 
executive testified that "nicotine contributes to the taste of ciga­
(jurisdictional statement); Baltimore & A R.R. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit 
Comm'n, 642 F.2d 1365, 1369-70 (p.C .. Cir. 1980); Bentex Pharms.; Inc. V. Richard· 
son, 463 F.2d 363, 368 n.17 (4th Cir. 1972) ("FDA not only has the right but is 
obligated to change its opinion if it learns its prior position was erroneous."), rev'd 
on other grounds, 412 U.S. 645 (1973); International Union, United Auto. Aero. & 
Agric. Implement Workers of America V. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 
1972); AMP, Inc. V. Gardner, 275 F. Supp. 410, 412 n.1 ·(S.D.N.Y. 1967), affd, 389 
F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1968); United States V. 60 28-Capsule Bottles ... "Unitrol," 211 
F. Supp. 207, 215 (D.N.J. 1962). 
39. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,628·30, 45,203-04. According to lawyers representing 
plaintiffs in class action lawsuits, an FDA finding that cigarettes are addictive might 
have a dramatic impact on pending claims against tobacco companies. See Milo 
Geyelin, Does FDA's Power Extend to Cigarettes?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1995, at B7. 
40. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,698-730. 
41. See id. at 44,730·39. 
42. See id. at 44,812-13, 44,831·55. The Agency also notes that consumers use 
tobacco products in an effort to control their weight. See id. at 44,744. 
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rettes and the pleasures of SIlJ,oking . . . [but] does not make 
cigarettes a drug or smoking an addiction.n43 The Tobacco Insti­
tute also insists that the manufacturing process focuses entirely 
on improving taste, though recently publicized documents sug­
gest otherwise.44 
The FDA has obtained volumes of internal industry docu­
ments which characterize nicotine as an addictive substance and 
candidly describe tobacco products as drug delivery devices.45 
For example, one document bluntly" compared nicotine to mor­
phine and cocaine, concluding that "the primary reason" people 
smoke "is to deliver nicotine into their bodies."46 Moreover, re­
cently Unearthed evidence suggests that the industry deliberate­
ly targets the youth market.47 
In addition, evidence suggests that cigarette manufacturers 
deliberately manipulat.e nicotine levels. The FDA accuses vari: 
43. Alix M. Freedman, Philip Morris Memo Likens Nicotine to Cocaine, WALL 
ST. J., Dec. 8, 1995, at B14. 
44. See Alix M. Freedman & Suein- L. Hwang, Why Don't Low-Tar Cigarettes 
Have Lower Nicotine?, WALL ST. J., July 14, 1995, at B1; see also Milo Geyelin & 
Alix M. Freedman, R.J. Reynolds Once Linked the Success of Rival Brand to "Nico­
tine Kick" Boost, WALL ST. J., May 23, 1996, at B2. 
45. See, e.g., 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,854-912, 45,100-08; id. at 44,856 (quoting the 
following statement by one tobacco industry executive: "Think of the cigarette pack 
as a storage container for a dais supply of nicotine. • . . Think of the cigarette as a 
dispenser for a dose unit of nicotine. . . • Think of a puff of smoke as the vehicle of 
nicotine . • • . Smoke is beyond question the most optimized vehicle of nicotine and 
the cigarette the most optimized dispenser of smoke."); see also Stanton A. Glanz et 
aI., Looking Through a Keyhole at the Tobacco -Industry: The Brown and Williamson 
Documents, 274 JAMA 219 (1995); Alix M. Freedman & Suein L. Hwang, Tliree Ex­
Employees Say Philip Morris Deliberately Controlled Nicotine Levels, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 19, 1996, at B1. 
46. See Timothy Noah et al., Tobacco Industry Lambastes the FDA for Using 
Too Many Secret Documents, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 1996, at B1, B2. A draft; report 
from Philip Morris frankly acknowledges the drug status of nicotine and discusses in 
scientific terms nicotine's 'effects on the brain: "CA] little nicotine seems to stimulate, 
while a lot sedates a person. A smoker learns to control the delivery of nicotine 
through the smoking technique to create the desired mood state." Freedman & 
Hwang, supra note 44, at B1. The report also discusses "nicotine delivery products," 
mentioning cigarettes along with other products whose sole function is to deliver 
nicotine into the body: "(N]icotine delivery devices range from snuff, chewing tobacco, 
cigars, pipes and conventional cigarettes to unique smoking articles, chewing gum, 
patches, aerosol sprays and inhalers." Id. at B14. 
47. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,480-81 (1996); Tactics for Getting Kids to Smoke, 
TAMPA TRIB., Nov. 10, 1995, at 18; Patricia Worklan, R:J. Reynolds' Secret Report 
Targets Young Adult Market, CHI. TRIB., July 11, 1996, at 19. 
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ous segments of the tobacco industry of using special processing 
techniques' such as breeding high-nicotine tobacco leaves, pur­
chasing leaves selectively to raise nicotine content, treating ciga­
rettes with chemicals such as ammonia to enhance nicotine 
absorption, adding nicotine-rich extracts from outside vendors 
(though not in domestically-marketed products), and altering 
nicotine levels in reconstituted tobacco.4B According to industry 
journals, a number of companies engage in blending high-nico­
tine American tobacco leaves with imported tobacco leaves "to 
offset the dilution impact of bland foreign tobaccos," enabling 
"manufacturers to attain the appropriate levels of nicotine in the 
smoke and provide much of the flavor."49 
Such evidence 'seriously undercuts the industry's assertion 
that its sole concern is product flavor. Indeed, many of the "fla­
vors" of tobacco products can be chemically "denicotinized."50 
Although the industry has claimed that ·the ratio of nicotine to 
tar is constant, recent FTC evaluations reveal a higher propor­
tion of nicotine to tar in certain low-tar cigarettes. 51 Nonethe­
less, the industry argues that the only valid evidence on which 
the FDA can rely is a company's advertising claims and other 
representations to the public.52 But if the Agency's allegations 
48. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,915-94, 45,108-28. Evidence also points to genetic· 
engineering as a means to manipulate tobacco plants' nicotine levels, and to careful 
selection of high-nicotine leaves and other tobacco plant parts in creating various 
tobacco blends. See id. at 44,937-38; Benjamin Wittes, The Tobacco Case the FDA 
Wants to Make, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 23; 1995, at I, 11. 
49. See Wittes, supra note 48, at 11-12. 
50. See 60 Fed. Reg. 41,453, 41,779-84 (1995); Wittes, supra note 48, at 12, 14. 
51. See Freedman & Hwang, supra note 44, at Bl. For example, a Marlboro 
King filter cigarette had a nicotine-to-tar ratio of 0.069 in 1994, while a Marlboro 
Lights king-sized filter cigarette had a ratio of 0.08, suggesting that the nicotine 
level was deliberately raised in the "light" version to compensate for nicotine loss in 
the tar-reduction process. See id. 
52. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 45,151; see also Susan H. Carchman, Should the FDA 
Regulate Nicotine-Containing Cigarettes? Has the Agency Established a Legal Basis 
and, If Not, Should Congress Grant It?, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 85, 114-32 (1996); 
Ann M. Boeckman, Comment, An Exercise in Administrative Creativity: The FDA's 
Assertion of Jurisdiction Over Tobacco, 45 CATH. U. L. REv. 991, 1025-30 (1996). The 
FDA has, however, successfully relied on numerous other sources to divine intent, 
see 61 Fed. Reg. at 45,152-70, including submissions to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and statements made in a company's patent applications, see HUTT & 
MERRILL, supra note 35, at 386. In searching for evidence that tobacco companies 
intend their products to affect the structure or function of the body, the FDA relies 
in part on statements made in one company's patent application for its high-nicotine 
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of industry manipulation of nicotine in tobacco products prove 
supportable, then it may have acquired. the previously elusive 
evidence of an intended drug use. 
2. FTC Authority Over Tobacco Products.-Although nico­
tine-the "active ingredient" in tobacco products-may now 
technically be regarded as a drug, the FDA would not be able to 
assert its authority at this juncture .if Congress has suggested 
that some other agency has exclusive control over cigarettes and 
smokeless tobacco products. To be sure, twice during the 1950s 
the FDA successfully pursued enforcement actions against ciga­
rettes promoted for therapeutic uses.53 Subsequently enacted 
legislation, "however, specifically reserved or delegated to the 
Federal Trade Commission primary control over the ,advertising 
of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products. 54 Did Congress 
thereby intend to exempt tobacco products from the FDA's con­
trol? Absent some contrary intent, Congress is presumed to 
grant priinary jurisdiction over a subject only to a single federal 
agency.55 
tobacco product. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,937, 45,095. 
53. See United States v." 354 Bulk Cartons .. ". Trim Reducing-Aid Cigarettes, 
178 F. Supp. 847, 851 (D.N.J. 1959); United States v. 46 Cartons ... Fairfax 
Cigarettes, 113 F. Supp. 336, 337 (D.N.J. 1953). 
54. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 4402, 4405 -(1994) (smokeless tobacco products); cf. id. 
§ 1336 ("Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit, restrict, expand, or 
otherwise affect the authority of the Federal Trade Commission with respect to 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the a'dvertising of cigarettes."); FTC v. Brown 
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The FTC is now con­
sidering revamping its cigarette tar and nicotine labeling requirements to reflect 
more accurately the range of these chemicals in smoke from "light" cigarettes, which 
can vary according to individual smoking style. See FTC Considers Tougher Labeling 
Rules for Cigarette Ads, ATLANTA J. CONST., Dec. 29, 1995, at 6B. The Commission 
also is contemplating enforcement actions against tobacco companies if it finds that 
they are using tar and nicotine ratings in advertisements to mislead consumers. 
55. See American Pharm. Ass'n v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 824, 830·31 (D.D.C. 
1974) (holding that Congress had delegated primary authority over controlled sub­
stances to the Drug Enforcement Administration, and therefore invalidating- an FDA 
effort to restrict the distribution of methadone), affd, 530 F.2d 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1976) 
(per curiam); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Mathews, 435 F. Supp. 5, 12-17 
(W.D. Ky. 1976) (holding that Congress had delegated primary authority over alco­
holic beverages to BATF, thereby invalidating an FDA initiative to require ingredient 
labeling); cf. Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 
151·58 (1991) (holding that Congress had delegated interpretive authority to the 
Secretary of Labor rather than the Commission); Breitmeyer v. Califano, 463 F. 
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Although a number of federal safety statutes expressly ex­
empt tobacco products,56 the FD&C Act was never amended to 
exclude these products from the FDA's jurisdiction.57 Nonethe­
less, the Agency repeatedly has disclaimed any general authority 
to regulate cigarettes,56 and Congress apparently has failed to 
enact any of the dozens of bills introduced during the last forty 
years to grant the FDA such jurisdiction.59 Thus, Congress has 
acquiesced in the FDA's longstanding interpretation of its very 
limited authority over tobacco products under the FD&C Act.GO 
Supp. 810, 816 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (holding that, where the FDA exercises jurisdiction, 
its regulatory jurisdiction is exclusive). The Agency disagrees with this contention. 
See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,408, 44,415 n.31 (attempting to distinguish Weinberger); id. 
at 44,547 ("Numerous Federal agencies have overlapping and complementary jurisdic­
tion that arises from their differing missions and expertise."). 
56. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1459(aX1) (1994) (exempting tobacco products from the 
Fair Packaging and Labeling Act); 15 U.S.C. § 2052(aX1XB) (1994) (exempting 
tobacco prQducts from coverage under the Consumer Product Safety Act); 15 U.S.C. 
§ 2602(2XBXiii) (1994) (exempting tobacco products from the Toxic Substances 
Control Act); 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) (1994) (exempting tobacco products from the Con­
trolled Substances Act); see also James T. O'Reilly, A Consistent Ethic of Safety 
Regulation: The Case for Improving Regulation of Tobacco Products, 3 ADMIN. L.J. 
215 (1989). 
57. The Dietary Supplement Health and Education.Act of 1994, which amends 
the FD&C Act, happens to exclude "tobacco" from the new definition of "dietary sup­
plement." Pub. L. No. 103-417, § 3(a), 108 Stat. 4327 (codified at 21 U.S.C. 
§ 3.21(ft)(1) (1994». 
58. See, e.g., Rural Development, Agriculture, and Related Agencies Appropria­
tions for 1990 (Part 8): Hearings Before the House Comm. on Appropriations, 100th 
Congo 409 (1989) (testimony of Frank Young, Commissioner of Food and Drugs); 
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce, 89th Congo 193 (1965). 
59. See, e.g., H.R. 2147, .103d Congo (1993) (proposing to prohibit discount 
coupOns and free samples of tobacco products; bar tobacco manufacturers from 
sponsoring cultural, sports, or other. public events; require additional health warnings 
on cigarette packages; and require that all cigarette additives be disclosed and 
comply with FDA safety standards); S. 2298, 102d Congo (1992); H.R. 5041, 101st 
Congo (1990); S. 769, 101st Congo (1989); H.R. 3294, 100th Congo (1987); H.R. 279, 
96th Congo (1979); S. 3317, 95th Congo (1978); H.R. 2248, 89th Congo (1965); 
S. 1682, 88th Congo .(1963); H.R. 11280, 84th Congo (1956); see also H.R. REP. NO. 
98-805, at 12 (1984) ("Federal laws that protect the public from hazardous food, 
drugs, and consumer products do not apply to cigarettes."); S. REP. No. 94-251, at 
43 (1976) ("[A]ny further regulation in this sensitive and complex area must be 
reserved for specific Congressional action."). 
60. See Young V. Community Nutrition Inst., 476. U.S. 974, 983 (1986) ("This 
failure to change the scheme under which the FDA operated is significant, for a 
congressional failure to revise Or repeal the agency's interpretation is persuasive 
evidence that the interpretation is the one intended by Congress." (internal quotation 
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Moreover, Congress has enacted several statutes restricting 
tobacco product labeling and advertising without ever suggesting 
any role for the Agency. 
In 1964, the Federal Trade Commission promulgated a 
stringent regulation to control the advertising of tobacco prod­
ucts and to require that cigarette packages and all other tobacco 
advertising include a warning statement.61 Within a year, Con­
gress responded by enacting the Federal Cigarette Labeling and 
Advertising Act.62 The Act was more moderate than the FTC's 
regulation, which it superseded; for example, Congress required 
that cigarette packages be labeled with a far less ominous state­
ment "Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your 
Health."63 In its accompanying declaration of purpose, Congress 
explained that it sought "to establish a comprehensive Federal 
marks omitted»; United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 n.10 (1979) ("[O]nce 
an agency's statutory construction has been fully brought to the attention of the 
public and the Congress, and the latter has not sought to alter that interpretation 
although it has amended the statute in other respects, then presumably the legisla­
tive intent has been correctly discerned." (internal quotation marks omitted»; Flood 
v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283 (1972) ("Remedial· legislation has been introduced repeat­
edly in Congress but none has ever been enacted. . • . This, obviously, has been 
deemed to be something other than mere congressional silence and passivity."); cf. 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 241-52 (1994) 
(evaluating rationales for divining intent from legislative inaction). The FDA does 
not, of course, accept this argument as compelling. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,619, 45,255­
61,' 45,267 (1996) (jurisdictional statement). 
61. 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8325 (1964) (The required warning label would state 
"that cigarette smoking is dangerous to health and may cause death from cancer 
and other diseases."); see also 34 Fed. Reg. 7917 (1969) (discussing 1964 regulation); 
111 CONG: REC. 13,900, 13,901 (1965) (statement of Sen. Moss) (discussing state 
initiatives). For a fuller discussion of the health risks associated with smoking and 
the history of the anti-smoking movement, see Matthew Baldini, Comment, The 
Cigarette Battle: Anti·Smoking Proponents Go for the Knockout, 26 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 348 (1995). 
62. Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 2, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1331-1337 (1994». The Act barred any other statements relating to smok­
ing and health on any cigarette packages. See ill. § 5(a). Congress determined that 
warnings were unnecessary in advertising, hut it noted that the FTC's authority 
with respect to false or misleading cigarette 'advertising was unaffected by the Act. 
See H.R. REP. No. 89-449, at 4-5 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.AN. 2350, 2353. 
The FTC retained its limited authority over tobacco advertising, including authority 
to require tar and nicotine content disclosure, but Congress granted it no additional 
powers. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1335a(a), 1336 (1994). The provisions barring the FTC from 
requiring warnings to accompany cigarette. advertising expired on July 1, 1969. See 
§§ 5(c), 10, 79 Stat. at 283·84. 
63. § 4, 79 Stat. at 283. 
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Program to deal with cigarette labeling and advertising with 
respect to any relationship between smoking and health," and to 
avoid impeding commer:ce "by diverse, nonuniform, and confus­
ing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations."64 Although 
geared primarily toward displacing state regulation,65 Congress 
also apparently intended to confirm limited regulatory authority 
in a single federal agency.66 
The original statute made only ambiguous references to the 
jurisdiction and authority of the FTC and other federal agencies 
over cigarette advertising. In 1967, the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) responded to a citizen complaint about broad­
cast cigarette advertising, holding that, under its "f~irness doc­
trine," stations which broadcast cigarette advertising have a 
duty to inform listeners of the dangers of smoking by airing 
public service announcements prepared by interested health 
organizations.67 Shortly thereafter, the FCC proposed to ban 
cigarette advertising from radio and television.68 Similarly, in 
1969, the FTC reinstituted its rulemaking proceedings to require 
that warnings accompany all cigarette advertising.69 
Once again Congress stepped in, this time to supplant the 
FCC's decision70 and to prevent both agencies from finalizing 
64. 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994). 
65. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,544, 44,546 (1996); infra Part III.B.1. 
66. The Act precluded the FTC, the FDA, and the Public Health Service from 
imposing any additional health warning requirements on the labeling of cigarettes. 
See H.R. REP. No. 89-449, at 19-21 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2350, 
2365. But see § 10, 79 Stat. at 284 (noting that the termination in 1969 of the 
provisions of the Act affecting advertising regulation "shall not be construed as 
limiting, expanding, or otherwise affecting the jurisdiction or authority which the 
Federal Trade Commission or any other Federal agency had prior to the date of the 
enactment of this Act"); Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1968) 
(holding that 1965 cigarette warning statute did hot bar the FCC from requiring 
stations to broadcast anti-smoking messages). 
67. See Television Station WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d 381, affd, 9 F.C.C.2d 921 
(1967), affd, Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1089-9.0 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
68. See 34 Fed. Reg. 1959 (1969). 
69. See 34 Fed. Reg. 7917 (1969) (proposing to require a detailed warning that 
"cigarette smoking is dangerous to -health -and may cause death from cancer, coro­
nary heart disease, chronic bronchitis, pulmonary emphysema, and other diseases"). 
70. See S. REP. No. 91-566, at 6-7, 12 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2652, 2657-58, 2663. A similar series of events occurred when the Consumer Product 
Safety Commission (CPSC) denied a petition requesting that it assert jurisdiction 
over "high tar" cigarettes. A court held that the CPSC did indeed have jurisdiction 
over these products. See American Pub. Health Ass'n v. Consumer Prod. Safety 
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their proposals.71 Effective January 1, 1971, Congress prohibit­
ed ·all broadcast advertising of cigarettes.72 In addition to its 
advertising ban, the 1969 Act required the use of a sterner label 
"Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette 
Smoking. Is Dangerous to Your Health."73 In 1984, Congress 
again amended the statute, requiring quarterly rotation of four 
different, and very specific, warning labels on cigarette packag­
es.74 Thus, over the course of the past three decades, Congress 
has micromanaged the cigarette labeling and advertising issue. 
Cigarettes are not the only to1;>acco products to have re­
ceived close legislative attention. In 1986, Congress enacted the 
Comm'n, [1972-1975 Transfer Binder] Consumer Ptod. Safety Guide (CCH) 'lI 75,081 
(D.D.C. May 30, 1975), vacated as moot, No. 75-1863 (D.C. Cir. June 15, 1976). 
Congress reacted swiftly by eliminating the Commission's jurisdiction over cigarettes. 
See Consumer Product Safety Commission Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 94-284, 
§ 3(c), 90 Stat. 503 (1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1261(0(2) (1994». 
71. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 7(b), 84 
Stat. 87, 89 ("Except as provided in subsection (a), nothing in this Act shall be 
construed to limit, restrict, expand, or otheryiise affect the authority of the Federal 
Trade Commission with respect to unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the 
advertising of cigarettes."). Subsectio~ (a) imposed a stay on the FrC rule regarding 
cigarette advertising until July 1; 1971. Congress appeared reluctant even to endorse 
the FrC's authority in this area, let alone that of any other agency, adding that 
"[n]othing in this Act shall be construed to affirm or deny the Federal Trade 
Commission's holding that it has the authority to issue trade regulation rules or to 
require an affirmative statement in any cigarette advertisement." Id. § 7(c). 
72. See id. § 6. Although challenged in court, Congress' broadcast ban was up­
held. See Capital Broad. Co. 'To Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), affd mem., 
405 U.S. 1000 (1972). The district court concluded that the First Amendment rights 
of broadcasters were not impaired under the statute, and that broadcasters had lost 
only the ability to collect revenues from others for broadcasting their commercial 
messages. See id. at 584 ("Finding nothing in the Act or its legislative history which 
precludes a broadcast licensee from airing its own point of view on any aspect of 
the cigarette smoking question, it is clear that petitioners' speech is not at issue."). 
Because substantial evidence demonstrated that radio and television advertising ef­
fectively reached a large audience of young people, the court held that Congress had 
a rational basis for prohibiting broadcast advertising. See id. at 585-86; see also 
infra Part IV (discussing cigarette advertising restrictions under current commercial 
speech doctrine). 
73. § 4, 84 Stat. at 88. 
74. See Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, § 4(c), 98 
Stat. 2200, 2203 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (1994». Similar rotating 
warnings were prescribed for cigarette advertisements and billboards. See id. 
§ 4(aX2), (3). For a fuller discussion of warning requirements for tobacco and other 
consumer products, see Lars Noah, The Imperative to Warn: Disentangling the "Right 
to Know" from the 'Weed to Know" About Consumer Product Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON 
REG. 293 (1994). 
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Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act.75 Re­
sponding to concerns that the use of chewing tobacco may cause 
gum disease and mouth cancer/6 Congress adopted warning re­
quirements similar to those required for cigarettes.77 The FTC 
wa~ given the responsibility for implementing and enforcing 
these requirements.78 The Act directed the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) to establish a public educa­
tion program,79 but Congress never provided funding for any ef­
forts to inform consumers about the health hazards associated 
with smokeless tobacco products.so 
Other federal agencies may, of course, still deal with certain 
tobacco-related issues unrelated to warning labels and advertis­
ing. For instance, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 
(BATF) collects excise taxes and regulates product manufactur­
ing.81 HHS, of which the FDA is a unit, recently promulgated a 
75. Pub. L. No. 99-252, 100 Stat. 30 (1986) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4408 
(1994». 
76. See S. REP. No. 99-209, at 3-4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.AN. 9-10 
(expressing concern that young people were using smokeless tobacco products with 
the misimpression that these were safe alternatives to cigarettes). 
77. See 15 U.S.C. § 4402(aX1), (cX1) (1994). These same warnings must appear 
in any advertising for smokeless tobacco products, enclosed in a special circle-and­
arrow graphic design. Id. § 4402(aX2), (bX2XB). 
78. See id. §§ 4402(bHd), 4404-4405. The FTC's implementing regulations appear 
in 16 C.F.R. § 307 (1996). One aspect of·the FTC's original regulations, exempting 
advertisements appearing on utilitarian items (such as tote bags) from the warning 
requirements, subsequently was invalidated. See Public Citizen v. FTC, 869 F.2d 
1541, 1554-57 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also 61 Fed. Reg. 45,883 (1996) (finalizing revised 
regulations to replace those invalidated by the court). The FDA explains that its 
advertising restrictions extend beyond the scope of the FTC's limited authority in 
this area. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,545 (1996). 
79. See 15 U.S.C. § 4401 (1994). A similar provision was added by the 1984 
cigarette legislation. See id. § 1341(a). Although HHS apparently has not imple­
mented these programs, presumably it would delegate the task to the Public Health 
Service, which is responsible for other health education programs, rather than to the 
FDA. See 42 C.F.R. § 51g (1996) (regulating grants for health education risk re­
duction); see. also 39 FEDERAL YELLOW BOOK 11-240 (1996) (listing the "Office on 
Smoking and Health" in HHS's National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and 
Health Promotion). 
80. Jeffrey Denny, Snuffs Tough Stuff; How the Smokeless Tobacco Industry 
Plays I~ Deadly Trade, WASH. POST, May 16, 1993, at C5. 
81. See 27 C.F.R. § 270 (1996). BATF "has no authority over the safety and 
labeling aspects of tobacco products with respect to consumer product safety." Letter 
from Daniel R. Black, Deputy Assoc. Dir., BATF, to James T. O'Reilly (Oct. 12, 
1988), cited in O'Reilly, supra note 56, at 226 nA8. 
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rule requiring all states to maintain and enforce laws prohibit­
ing the sale of tobacco products to persons under the age of eigh­
teen as a condition of receivi,ng block grants controlled by the 
Department.82 HHS also must transmit reports to Congress 
concerning research on the addictiveness of tobacco products and 
any recommendations for legislative or administrative action.83 
Other federal agencies recently have become interested in the 
regulation of environmental tobacco smoke.84 
Even so, the history of federal legislation addressing ciga­
rette labeling and advertising suggests a congressional decision 
against delegating its legislative authority to any federal agency 
though reserving some of the FTC's existing authority over ad­
vertising as applied to tobacco products and directing it to imple­
ment the smokeless tobacco controls~ The failure to address the 
FDA's role is notable but hardly surprising given the Agency's 
own prior view that it lacked anything other than a limited 
authority to regulate tobacco products under the FD&C Act. 
Congressional silence undermines rather than buttresses the 
FDA's current attempt to restrict the advertising and distribu­
tion of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products. 
B. Tobacco Products as Medical Devices 
Even assuming that the nicotine in tobacco products falls 
within the FDA's authority over drugs, the treatment of such 
products as medical devices seems tenuous. The Agency ac­
knowledges that regulating cigarettes and other tobacco prod­
82. See 61 Fed. Reg. 1492 (1996) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 96.122-.130) 
(requiring that states engage in random, unannounced inspections of tobacco product 
vendors and maintain minimum compliance levels in order to continue to receive 
grants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 300x-26 (1994». 
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 290aa-2(b) (1994). 
84. In 1994, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) pro­
posed standards for indoor air quality, including the control of environmental tobacco 
smoke in the workplace. See 59 Fed. Reg. 15,968 (1994) (proposing to ban smoking 
in all workplaces except for in designated smoking areas vented directly to the 
outdoors). The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) also has addressed the issue 
of passive smoking. See, e.g., 57 Fed. Reg. 27,772 (1992); see also Alan B. Horowitz, 
Terminating the "Passive" Pciradax: A Proposal for Federal Regulation of Environmen­
tal Tobacco Smoke, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 183, 215-19 (1991) (suggesting that the EPA 
issue national uniform standards under the Clear Air Act to protect people from 
secondhand smoke). 
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ucts as drugs would logically result in a ban on such products.85 
Under the FD&C Act, approval of a new drug application (NDA) 
requires that a drug product be proven "safe and effective" for 
its intended use.86 Because of the documented health hazards of 
smoking, this NDA requirement would pose a serious obstacle 
for the future marketing of tobacco products as drugs. 
Even if this premarket approval hurdle could somehow be 
surmounted,87 the FDA would have to require that cigarettes be 
available only on a doctor's prescription, at least if it wanted to 
control their advertising.86 Instead, the Agency has opted to 
take a different and more dubious regulatory tack. As explained 
in the next section, the new rules would regulate tobacco prod­
ucts as medical devices,89 specifically as "restricted" medical de­
85. See 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314, 41,348 (1995) ("The products would be unapproved 
new drugs, ~d as such, FDA could' require their removal from the market."); see 
also 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(d), 355(a) (1994) (prohibiting the sale of unapproved new 
drugs); Public Health Cigarette Amendments of 1971: Hearings Before the Consumer 
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 92d Congo 239 (1972) 
(statement of Charles C. Edwards, Commissioner of Food and Drugs) ("[I]f cigarettes 
were to be classified as drugs, they would have to be removed from the market 
because it would be impossible to prove they were safe for their intended us[e]."); id. 
at 242 ("[L]abeling or banning cigarettes is a step that can be take[n] only by the 
Congress. Any such move by FDA would be inconsistent with the clear congressional 
intent."). The Agency also asserts that banning- tobacco products would not be the 
most effective means of protecting the public health-it fears that the highly addic­
tive nature' of nicotine may mean adverse health consequences for smokers as a 
consequence of inadequate treatment for Withdrawal and poor-quality black market 
cigarettes. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,398, 44,413 (1996). 
86. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1994); 21 C.F.R. pt. 314 (1996). The Act defines "new 
drug" as any drug "the composition of which is such that such drug is not generally 
recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate 
the safety and effectiveness of drugs, as safe and effective for use under the condi­
tions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof." 21 U.S.C. 
§ 321(pXl). For a summary of some of the most important requirements, see Lars 
Noah, Sham Petitioning as a Threat to the Integrity of the Regulatory Process, 74 
N.C. L. REV. I, 6-10 (1995). 
87. See infra notes 158-160 and accompanying text (discussing possible exemp­
tions from new drug requirements). ­
88. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (granting the FDA authority to regulate the advertis­
ing of prescription drugs); id. § 353(b) (requiring prescription status for drugs which 
are -habit-forming or are not safe for use except under the supervision of physicians 
because of their toxicity or potentiality for harmful effect). 
89. The statute defines a medical device as follows: 
[A]n instrument, apparatus, ... or other similar- or related article ... which 
is . . . (2) intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other condition, or in 
the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other ani­
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vices,90 so that the FDA can exert control over their advertising
91as well as their distribution and use.
The FDA asserts that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco 
products are combination drug-device products which it has the 
discretion to regulate as medical devices.92 The Agency explains 
this categorization by claiming first that tobacco products, be­
cause they consist of nicotine (a drug) and other components,93 
are combination products which together function as drug-deliv­
ery systems.94 The FDA then lists other examples of so-called 
mals, or (3) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of 
man or other animals, and which does not achieve any of its principal intend­
ed purposes through chemical action within or on the body of man or other 
animals and which is not dependent upon being metabolized for the 
achievement of its principal intended purposes. 
Id. § 321(h); see also Gary E. Gamerman, Note, Intended Use and Medical Devices: 
Distinguishing Nonmedical "Devices· from Medical "Devices· Under 21 U.S.C. 
§ 321(h), 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 806 (1993). 
90. 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,405. Pursuant to the Act, the restricted device designa­
tion is appropriate if, because of a device's "potentiality for harmful effect or the 
collateral measures necessary to its use, the Secretary determines that there cannot 
otherwise be reasonable assurance of its safety and effectiveness." 21 U.S.C. 
§ 360j(eXIXB) (1994); see also 21 C.F.R. § 807.3(i) (1996) (defining restricted devices 
as those for which the FDA has "restricted sale, distribution, or use only upon the 
written or oral authorization of a practitioner licensed by law to administer or use 
the device or upon such other conditions as the Commissioner may prescribe"); infra 
Part II.C. 
91. Congress has, in general, assigned to the Fl'C the duty to oversee product 
advertising, including the advertising of tobacco products. See supra Part II.A.2. 
Under the FD&C Act, the FDA has advertising authority only over prescription 
drugs and "restricted" medical devices. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(n), (q) (1994). 
92. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,403 (observing that "the device provisions offer FDA 
more flexibility"); id. at 44,414-16 (suggesting that it could have imposed many of 
the same restrictions by issuing regulations pursuant to its authority over drug 
products); see also 21 C.F.R. § 3.2(eXl) (1996) (defining a combination product as a 
"product comprised of two or more regulated components, i.e., drug/device"). 
93. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,619, 45,206-07 (1996) (jurisdictional statement). In the 
case of cigarettes, the FDA asserts that the 
primary purpose of the parts of the cigarette ... is to effectuate the delivery 
of a carefully controlled amount of nicotine to a site in the human body where 
it can be absorbed ...• The delivery system, the nicotine-containing cigarette, 
must be lit to have its intended effect on the structure or function of the 
body, and, once lit and used, is discarded. 
Id. (quoting NPRM). Smokeless tobacco products, the Agency explains, "function like 
infusion devices or transdermal patches that deliver continuous amounts of nicotine 
to the cheek tissue for absorption into the bloodstream. The device element of 
smokeless products is the tobacco, which contains the nicotine but is not intended to 
be consumed." Id.; see also id. at 45,213-16. 
94. See id. at 45,208-18; 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314, 41,347 (1995) ("FDA considers 
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"pre-filled delivery systems," such as transdermal patches, pre­
filled syringes, and metered-dose inhalers (MDIs), which it as­
serts are comparable to tobacco products in function.95 Finally, 
although it acknowledges that its Center for Drug Evaluation 
and Research (CDER) has primary jurisdiction over such combi­
nation products because they represent dedicated rather than 
generic delivery systems, the Agency asserts that it nonetheless 
may exercise its discretion to regulate tobacco products as medi­
cal devices.96 Ignoring their primary mode of action as a drug, 
the FDA argues that CDER's undoubted jurisdiction over pre­
filled drug-delivery systems does not necessarily dictate which 
provisions of the FD&C Act should apply to tobacco products.97 
Although the Agency certainly may select from among the 
available statutory provisions those most suited to its particular 
regulatory goal, this discretionary power is limited by the terms 
of the statutory provisions themselves. For a number of reasons, 
the FDA cannot logically treat tobacco products as medical de­
vices, let alone "restricted" devices. For instance, in order to 
sustain its drug-delivery system argument, the Agency must 
acknowledge and distinguish relevant regulatory precedents. 
The FDA has required that smoking deterrent products such as 
transdermal nicotine patches and nicotine chewing gum, which 
are virtually indistinguishable from cigarettes in their function 
articles . . . whose primary purpose is the delivery of a drug, and that are distribut­
ed with a drug product to be drug delivery systems."); see also Anita Manning, AMA 
Calls for Tobacco Regulation, USA TODAY, June 8, 1994, at 1A (The AMA labeled 
nicotine "the most addictive drug we know . . . . Cigarettes are no different than 
syringes. They are a drug delivery device. . . . They should be regulated as we 
regulate morphine and heroin."). In reaching its conclusion, the FDA purports to rely 
on the Intercenter Agreement Between the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research 
(CDER) and the Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH), § VII(AX1Xb) 
(Oct. 31, 1991) (hereinafter the "Intercenter Agreement"); see 61 Fed. Reg. at 45,211. 
95. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 45,206, 45,211; 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,521. In the preamble 
accompanying the final regulations, the FDA also lists catheter flush solution and in­
travenous infusion pumps pre-filled with a simple diluent as combination products it 
has regulated as devices. 
96. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,403 (1996). 
97. See id. at 44,400-03 (claiming that the FDA has the authority to regulate 
tobacco products under either the drug or medical device provisions of the Act, or 
both, as it deems appropriate); see also 21 C.F.R. § 3.1 (1996) (stating that 
"[n]othing in this section prevents FDA from using any agency resources it deems 
necessary to ensure adequate review of the safety and effectiveness of any product, 
or the substantial equivalence of any device to a predicate device"). 
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and intended effect, satisfy NDA requirements prior to market­
ing.98 With regard to these products, the Agency chose not to 
categorize either product as a medical device. Indeed, the FDA 
has classified all smoking deterrent products as drugs.99 
In addition, the FD&C Act was amended in 1990 to require 
that a product be regulated according to its "primary mode of ac­
tion."100 For example, ordinary empty syri~ges are regulated as 
medical devices, while pre-filled syringes are regulated as drugs. 
Under this rationale, dedicated drug-delivery devices clearly 
ought to be regarded as drug products, not medical devices. As 
the FDA itself notes, the 1991 Intercenter Agreement between 
CDER and the Center for Devices and Radiological Health 
(CDRH) supports this conclusion,lOl but it nonetheless believes 
that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products should be regu­
lated as medical devices.102 In the past, the FDA successfully 
has used counterintuitive classifications of products in order to 
maximize its regulatory control, but these efforts almost always 
98. The NDA for Nicorette, a prescription drug chewing gum product containing 
2 mg. of nicotine per piece, was approved in 1984; the product is indicated "as a 
temporary aid to the cigarette smoker seeking to give up his or her smoking habit 
while· participating in a behavior modification program under medical or dental 
supervision." 49 PHYsICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 2346 (1995); see also Nicotine Nasal 
Spray Aims to Halt Smoking, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1996, at C7 ("The nicotine nasal 
spray • . . reaches the bloodstream faster than the nicotine in the gum or patch, 
offering the potential of almost immediate relief of cigarette cravings."). 
99. See 58 Fed. Reg. 31,236 (1993). The final rule establishes that any smoking 
deterrent product for over-the-counter (OTC) .use is not generally recognized as safe 
and effective and is misbranded. See 21 C.F.R. § 310.544. Any such nonprescription 
products containing active ingredients are new drugs and require a new drug appli­
cation or an abbreviated new drug application. See ill. The FDA recently approved 
OTC sale of Nicorette gum and the Nicotrol patch. See Amal K. Naj, J&J Nicotine 
Patch Is Cleared for Sale Over the Counter, WAIJ.. ST. J., July 5, 1996, at B10; John 
Schwartz, FDA Approves Nicorette Sales, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 1996, at A7. 
100. Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, § 16(a), 104 Stat. 
4511, 4526 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 353 (1994» (requiring the develop­
ment of intercenter agreements to regulate products that constitute a combination of 
a drug, device, or biologic); 21 C.F.R. § 3.4 (summarizing lntercenter Agreements). 
101. See M-D-D-I REPORTS ("The Gray Sheet"), Nov. 25, 1991, at 6-11 (Under the 
lntercenter Agreement, a "device containing a drug substance as a component with 
the primary purpose of the combination product being to fulfill a drug purpose is a 
combination product and will be regulated as a drug by CDER. "). 
102. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,402-03. Despite its decision to regulate cigarettes as 
medical devices, the FDA appears to assign all tobacco products ~ its drug center; 
for instance, it requires that certain labeling and advertising be forwarded to CDER. 
See 21 C.F.R. § 897.30(aX2). 
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involved treating medical devices and other products as 
drugs.103 Here, for perhaps the fIrst time, the FDA is playing 
this semantic game in reverse, trying to force an apparent drug 
product into the less exacting medical device category.104 
By reversing its position on the proper classifIcation of dedi­
cated drug-delivery systems, at least in the treatment of tobacco 
products as medical devices, the FDA sets a dubious precedent 
for other products. At present, for instance, the Agency regards 
MDI actuators and infusion pumps as drug-delivery systems 
within CDER's jurisdiction.105 If the tobacco regulations reflect 
a revised FDA interpretation of the statute, MDI actuators and 
other such articles could be recharacterized as medical devices 
subject to less stringent controls. (Of course, the FDA could re­
103. The FDA has used the. broad statutory definition of "drug" on numerous 
occasions to regulate products that otherwise would have been subject to the less 
stringent food, device, or cosmetic provisi!lns of the Act. See, e.g., United States v. 
An Article of Drug . . . Bacto·Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 799 (1969) (holding that, in 
view of the statutory purpose, "it was entirely reasonable for the Secretary to 
determine that the discs, like the antibiotics they serve, are drugs and similarly sub· 
ject to pre-clearance certification"); A14P Inc. v. Gardner, 389 F.2d 825, 826 (2d Cir. 
1968) (upholding the F~A's categorization of a nylon vessel clamp (ligature) as a 
drug rather than a device); cf. National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Mathews, 557 
F.2d 325, 329 (2d Cir. 1977) (rejecting an FDA attempt to regulate high potency 
vitamins as drugs); United States v. Article ... OVA II, 414 F. Supp. 660, 661-65 
(D.N.J. 1975) (rejecting an FDA attempt to categorize a home pregnancy kit as a 
drug), affd, 535 F.2d 1248 (3d Cir. 1976). The FDA also has declared that all 
intrauterine devices (IUDs) which incorporate heavy metals or other chemicals for 
contraceptive purposes were "new drugs" within the meaning of the FD&C Act. See 
21 C.F.R. § 310.502(a); 38 Fed. Reg. 6137 (1973). 
104. The Agency has, on occasion, asserted device status for products that argu­
ably are completely beyond its jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v. Undetermined 
Number of Unlabeled Cases, 21 F.3d 1026, 1028-29 (10th Cir. 1994) (in vitro diag­
nostic specimen collection containers used for insurance underwriting purposes); 
United States v. 25 Cases ... "Sensor Pad," 942 F.2d 1179, 1182 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(self-examination devices to help detect breast cancer); United States v. 23, More or 
Less, Articles, 192 F.2d 308, 310 (2d Cir. 1951) (self-help phonograph records); 
United States v. 22 Rectangular . . . MD-200, 714 F. Supp. 1159, 1164 (D. Utah 
1989) (sterilizer machine for s:urgical instruments). 
105. At present, FDA-regulated firms must clear drug-delivery systems through 
CDER. See, e.g., M-D-D-I REPORTS ("The Gray. Sheet"), Nov. 28, 1994, at 6-7 (de­
scribing a California company which was developing a new aerosol cartridge delivery 
system for use with a variety of drugs and planned to file an investigational new 
drug application before beginning clinical trials); M-D-D-I REPORTS ("The Gray 
Sheet"), Apr. 4, 1994, at I&W-10 (quoting CDRH official as advising device manufac­
turers that "[m]any drug delivery systems have been on hold" because of questions 
about cross-labeling of the devices and the drugs that they deliver). 
27 1996] Tobacco Regulations 
spond that tobacco products ar.e sui generis, a case to be treated 
separately from other drug-delivery systems and that, in the 
future, it will deal with other such products on. a case-by-case 
basis.) There are important differences in the rigor of the ap­
proval and in the oversight processes between the "drug" and 
"device" categories.106 Certain combination products are, for 
safety reasons, better treated as drugs than as devices. Argu­
ably, products such as transdermal patches and syringes pre­
filled with biologics genuinely require the more stringent con­
trols that accompany a "drug" designation. 
C. Tobacco Products as "Restricted" Medical Devices 
The FDA next asserts that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco 
products are not only medical devices, but are also properly 
characterized and regulated as "restricted" medical devices. The 
FD&C Act authorizes the Secretary to promulgate regulations 
restricting a device's "sale, distribution, or use ... if, because of 
its potentiality for harmful effect or the collateral measures 
necessary to its use, the Secretary determines that there cannot 
otherwise be reasonable assurance of its safety and effective­
ness."107 The Agency asserts that all of its restrictions on dis­
tribution and advertising are necessary to reduce tobacco 
products' potentiality for harmful effect.lOS 
The regulations c.ontain a number of provisions aimed at 
substantially reducing the sale and distribution of tobacco prod­
ucts to minors. The FDA will require, among other things., that 
106. See, e.g., Peter Barton. Hutt et al., The Standard of Evidence Required for 
Premarket Approval Under the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 47 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 605 (1992); Robert B. Leflar, Public Accountability and Medical Device 
Regulation, 2 lIARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1989); Lawrence S. Makow, Note, Medical De­
vice Review at the Food and Drug Administration: Lessons from Magnetic Resonance 
Spectroscopy and Biliary Lithotripsy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 709 (1994). 
107. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(eX1X~) (1994). 
108. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,405 (1996) ("The agency has determined that 
unless measures are taken now to prohibit the sale and promotion of [tobacco] 
products to young people under the age of 18, there cannot otherwise be reasonable 
assurance of safety."). The FDA argues, for example, that the photographic identifica­
tion requirements are necessary to prevent sales to those under the age of 18. See 
id. at 44,439-40; see also id. at 44,444 (explaining the necessity for a prohibition on 
the use of nontobacco product names). 
28 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 48:1:1 
retailers verify the age of purchasers by demanding picture 
identification;l09 prohibit vending-machine sales in certain 10­
cations;l1O and prohibit the distribution of free samples of both 
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco pro ducts. 111 The FDA may 
have difficulty justifying its point-of-sale restrictions under its 
authority to limit the distribution of restricted devices. The 
reach of the statute may not be as great as the Agency would 
like, but regulations governing vending-machine sales, photo 
identification restrictions, and the like may be better left to 
state control.112 
For most medical devices, the FTC has advertising authority 
pursuant to the FTC Act, which prohibits false or deceptive 
advertising.113 In 1976, Congress gave the FDA limited author­
ity to regulate the advertising of restricted medical devices.114 
109. See 21 C.F.R. § 897.14(bX1). 
110. See id. § 897.14(c). 
111. See id. § 897.16(aX2Xi). The FDA originally had proposed banning mail-order 
sales, but it decided to drop this restriction as unnecessary. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 
44,458-59. A number of small tobacco retailers maintain sales sites on the "World 
Wide Web" through which they market lesser-known cigarette brands in the United 
States and abroad. Many of these retailers make no attempt to verify the age of 
their customers or to include the required Surgeon General's Warning on their 
Internet sites. See Timothy Noah, Cigarettes Are Being Marketed Through Web Sites 
on the Internet, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 1996, at B2; see also 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,501­
02 (discussing promotional questions posed by the use of the Internet). 
112. All 50 states currently ban the sale of tobacco products to children under 
the age of 18, but enforcement of the state statutes has been notoriously lax. See 
Barnaby J. Feder, A Study Finds that Teen-Ag~rs Are Buying Cigarettes with Ease, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1996, at A10 (According to a recent government survey, the 
percentage of teenage smokers between the ages of 12 and 17 who have successfully 
purchased their own cigarettes rose from 58% in 1989 to 62% in 1993.). HHS 
recently promulgated a final rule requiring all states to maintain and enforce laws 
prohibiting the sale of tobacco products to persons under the age of 18 as a con­
dition for continuing to receive federal block grants. See 61 Fed. Reg. 1492 (1996) (to 
be codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 96.122-.130) (requiring random, unannounced state 
inspections of tobacco product vendors and demanding that states maintain minimum 
compliance levels in order to continue to receive grants). 
113. See 15 U.S.C. § 52 (1994); see also Removatron Int'l Corp. v. FTC, 884 F.2d 
1489, 1498 (1st Cir. 1989) (upholding an FTC order requiring that an advertising 
claim for a device promising permanent removal of unwanted hair be supported by 
at least one well-controlled scientific study). 
114. See Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, § 3(eX1), 90 
Stat. 539, 577-78 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 352(q), (r) (1994». This power and others 
apply only to those restricted devices identified as such by the FDA through the 
issuance of regulations under § 520(e) of the FD&C Act. See 21 U.S.C. § 360j(e) 
(1994). Other special provisions applicable to restricted devices require the sub mis­
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Fourteen years earlier, the Agency had acquired advertising 
jurisdiction over prescription drug pro ducts. lIS It is not clear 
why Congress chose to specify "restricted" rather than "prescrip­
tion" devices, though the .available legislative history suggests
1I6that these terms were viewed as synonymous.
The FDA's implementation of this authority over the last 
two decades has only contributed to the confusion about its 
meaning. Initially, the Agency announced that all existing pre­
scription devices would be regarded as restricted medical devic­
es.1l7 Although invalidated on procedural grounds,1I8 this con­
temporaneous interpretation of the statute-equating "restrict­
ed" with prescription-deserves some judicial deference.1l9 
The FDA never promulgated general regulations to imple­
sion of all labeling and sllll.lples of advertising, see id. § 360QX1XBXi), and authorize 
broader FDA factory inspections, see id. § 374(a); see also id. §§ 360d(aX2XBXv), 
360e(dX1XBXii) (providing that perfonnance standards and premarket approval 
requirements must take account of any 8pecial device restrictions). 
115. See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 131(a), 76 Stat. 780, 
791-92 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (1994»; see also Lars Noah, Death of a Sales­
man: To What Extent Can the FDA Regulate the Promotional Statements of Pharma­
ceutical Sales Representatives?, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 309, 322-26 (1992). The FrC is 
responsible for regulating the advertising of nonprescription drug products. See 36 
Fed. Reg. 18,539 (1971) (announcing a memorandum of understanding between the 
FDA and the FrC). 
116. See H.R. REp. No. 94-853, at 25 (1976) ("In addition to authorizing the 
Secretary to limit a device to prescription status, conditions on sale or distribution 
could include use only within hospitals or clinics. . . . Also, . . . certain devices 
which would not be appropriate for use by the ordinary layman could be authorized 
for use by trained nurses and technicians." (emphasis added»; S. 510, 94th Congo 
§§ 707, 708(a) (1975) (this earlier version of the legislation referred only to "prescrip­
tion devices"), reprinted in 121 CONGo REC. 10701 (1975). The FDA asserts that the 
restricted device provision, though a "counterpart" to the prescription drug adver­
tising provision, "is significantly broader." See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,405. 
117. See 41 Fed. Reg. 22,620, 22,621 (1976) ("Restricted devices include all 
prescription devices as now defined in 21 C.F.R. § 801.109 ...."). This cross-refer­
ence remains in the regulations. See 21 C.F.R. § 807.3(i) (1996). 
118. See In re Establishment Inspection Portex, Inc., 595 F.2d 84, 86 (1st Cir. 
1979); Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. FDA, 589 F.2d 1175, 1181 (2d Cir. 1978). Both 
cases involved the FDA's broader factory inspection authority over restricted devices. 
See 21 U.S.C. ~ 374(a). 
119. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142 (1976); NLRB v. 
Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 274-75 (1974); Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985, 989 
(9th Cir. 1992); Rhodia, Inc. v. FDA, 608 F.2d 1376, 1379 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United 
States v. Undetennined Quantities ... Exachol, 716 F. Supp. 787, 795 (S.D.N.Y. 
1989); cf. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 187 (1991) (deferring to revised interpreta­
tion of statute where supported by "reasoned analysis"). 
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ment its authority over restricted medical devices. In 1980, it 
issued a proposed regulation,120 but this was withdrawn the 
following year.121 In recent years the Agency has repeatedly 
announced its plans to issue a rulemaking proposal on this is­
sue,l22 but the FDA withdrew this promise just one week after 
the issuance of the proposed tobacco regulations.123 
The FDA has successfully asserted its restricted device 
authority on only one occasion; when it promulgated special 
rules for the labeling and distribution of hearing aids in 
1977.124 The legal basis for this decision is hardly obvious.l25 
The preamble to the final regulation cited the restricted device 
120. See 45 Fed. Reg. 65,619, 65,624 (1980) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 899.60) 
(proposed Oct. 3, 1980) (defining the advertising limitation on restricted devices in 
its entirety as follows: "Any advertisement for a restricted device may not recom­
mend or imply any use that is not in the labeling for the restricted device."). 
121. See 46 Fed. Reg. 57,569 (1981). In explaining its withdrawal of the proposal, 
the Agency cited comments that the proposed regulations were overly burdensome 
and that the FDA had exceeded its authority under § 520(e) of the FD&C Act. See 
id. 
122. See, e.g., 60 Fed. Reg. 23,304, 23,310 (1995) (Semi-annual Unified Regulatory 
Agenda) ("FDA would propose to include in this [restricted] category devices such as 
those that pierce or penetrate the skin, implantable devices, devices that introduce 
medicinal gas or energy into the body and devices that are used for diagnosis that 
must be interpreted or analyzed by a qualified health professiona!."). Publication of 
such a notice of proposed rulemaking was anticipated sometime during September of 
1995. See id. Earlier timetables suggested a proposal by May of 1994. See 59 Fed. 
Reg. 20,355, 20,356 (1994). 
123. See 60 Fed. Reg. 60,033 (1995) (noting that the plan was withdrawn on 
Aug. 16, 1995). 
124. See 42 Fed. Reg. 9286, 9293-94 (1977) (codified as amended at 21 C.F.R. 
§§ 801.420-.421 (1996». The regulations do not explicitly characterize hearing aids as 
restricted devices. See id.; see also 21 C.F.R. § 874.3300 (1996) (classification regula­
tion). Nonetheless, the FDA now refers to its regulation of this device as precedent 
for its use of the restricted device provisions of the statute. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 
44,406, 44,408 (1996). 
125. The regulations were challenged unsuccessfully. See 42 Fed. Reg. 40,215 
(1977) (agreeing to a stay of the effective date pending the outcome of this litiga­
tion); New Jersey Guild of Hearing Aid Dispensers v. Long, 384 A.2d 795, 801 n.2 
(N.J: 1978) (noting that the district court had upheld the regulations). Manufacturers 
have attempted to rely on the FDA's assertion of jurisdiction as a basis for cliaUeng­
ing the FTC's continued supervision of their advertising. See In re Dahlberg, 1995 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19697, at *13-*15 (D. Minn. Mar. 31, 1995) (rejecting this argu­
ment). Similarly, companies have argued that the FDA's regulations preempt contin­
ued state supervision. See Kievlan v. Dahlberg Elecs., 144 Cal. Rptr. 585, 590 (App. 
1978) (concluding that the FDA had not in tact classified hearing aids as restricted 
devices); see also Massachusetts v. Hayes, 691 F.2d 57, 60-64 (1st Cir. 1982); Smith 
V. Pingree, 651 F.2d 1021, 1023-25 (5th Cir. 1981). 
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prOVISIon as statutory authority for the regulations, but the 
proposal never did so because its publication pre-dated passage 
of the MDA by one month.l26 Moreover, the final rules pre-dat­
ed the successful judicial challenges to the Agency's policy of 
treating all prescription devices as restricted medical devic­
es.127 Finaliy, to the extent that this regulation serves as any 
meaningful guidance for the restricted device provision, it again 
reflects an assumption that the term "restricted" refers only to 
those medical devices whose distribution has been limited to 
prescription or professional sale. The FDA has not, however, 
restricted access to tobacco products in any such fashion. 
Thus, after twenty years of disuse, the FDA suddenly and 
creatively seizes upon its restricted device authority as a con­
venient basis for controlling the advertising of tobacco products; 
products which heretofore have never been regarded as medical 
devices, much less restricted devices. Putting hearing aids to one 
side, the Agency has not assumed control over the advertising of 
any of the other thousands of classes of medical devices current­
lyon the market.l28 This is not a case. of creatively squeezing a 
nondevice product into an existing medical device pigeonhole. In­
stead, the FDA is effectively rediscovering a narrow statutory 
category solely to control a nondevice product. Ironically, once 
126. See 41 Fed. Reg. 16,756, 16,758 (1976) (though anticipating the use of its 
restricted device authority under the then·pending legislation); see also 21 U.S.C. 
§ 360j(e) (1994) (specifying requirements for NPRMs under the restricted device 
provision); In re Establishment Inspection Portex, Inc., 595 F.2d 84, 86 (1st Cir. 
1979) ("Comment on the prescription device regulation obviously would not have 
been addressed to the additional strictures imposed on the industry by the 1976 
amendment."); Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. FDA, 589 F.2d 1175, 1181 (2d Cir. 1978) 
("Congress was careful to provide a rulemaking procedure in which all participants 
would have a full opportunity to present their views and analyses of the data 
underlying the proposed regulation.");' cf. Chocolate Mfrs. Ass'n v. Block, 755 F.2d 
1098, 1104·07 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that, unless the final regulations are a 
"logical outgrowth" of the original proposal, the Administrative Procedure Act reo 
quires publication of a revised NPRM to allow for additional comments). 
127. See supra note 118. In the context of more recent proposals, the FDA did 
not once characterize hearing aids as "restricted" devices. See 58 Fed. Reg. 59,695, 
59,696 (1993) (announcing plans to propose revisions to the current distribution and 
labeljng regulations). 
128. See Sandra J.P. Dennis, Promotion of Devices: An Extension of FDA Drug 
Regulation or a New Frontier?, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 87, 93·94 (1993); Ronald M. 
Johnson, FDA RegUlatory Actions and Future Plans for Medical Device Promotion 
and Advertising, 47 FOOD & DRUG. L.J. 291, 292 (1992). 
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the FDA asserts its restricted device authority to regulate adver­
tising, the FTC-the one agency that Congress understood as 
having the authority to regulate the advertising of tobacco prod­
ucts-automatically loses its general jurisdiction over those 
products.129 
D. FDA Authority to Regulate Advertising 
ofRestricted Devices 
The new regulations prohibit the placement of outdoor ad­
vertising for tobacco products, including billboards and posters, 
within 1,000 feet of any playground or school,l30 and they limit 
all tobacco product advertising in publications with an under 
eighteen-year-old target audience to black print on a white back­
ground only, sometimes characterized as a "text only" or "tomb­
stone" format.13l The regulations also prohibit the marketing, 
distribution, sale, or gift of any items, other than the tobacco 
products themselves, bearing the product name, logo, selling 
message or other "indicia of product identification," and they 
prevent tobacco product manufacturers, distributors, and retail­
ers from sponsoring any sporting, musical or other social events 
using brand-names or other identifying information.132 
The FDA's power to regulate the advertising of restricted 
devices is not unlimited. The scant legislative history of the 
restricted device provision suggests that Congress meant to give 
the FDA advertising authority. over restricted devices that was 
co-extensive with its authority over prescription drugs.l33 But 
129. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(r) ("[N]o advertisement of a restricted device, published 
after the effective date of this paragraph shall, with respect to the matters specified 
in this paragraph or covered by regulations issued hereunder, be subject to the 
provisions of [the FTC Act,] sections 52 through 55 of title 15."). The FTC would, 
however, retain its more specific authority over, for instance, smokeless tobacco 
products because it derives from a statute other than the FTCA. See supra note 54 . 
. 130. See 21 C.F.R. § 897.30(b). 
131. See id. § 897.32(a). This restriction applies when minors account for either 
15% of a publication's readership or two miIlion readers of a publication. 
132. See id. § 897.34. The regulations would, however, permit such events to be 
sponsored in the name of the corporation which manufactures the products, provided 
that the corporate name had been registered before January 1, 1995. See id. 
§ 897.34(c). 
133. See S. REP. No. 94-33, at 17 (1975); see also 45 Fed. Reg. 65,619, 65,624 
(1980) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 899.60) (proposed Oct. 3, 1980) (defining the 
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the Agency has imposed far more intrusive restrictions on tobac­
co product advertising than are permissible in the realm of pre­
scription drugs. For example, the use of prescription brand­
names on reminder advertisements to doctors currently is per­
missible;l34 yet the FDA will eradicate the use of tobacco 
product brand-names on any item other than the products them­
selves.l35 
The restrictions on the format and content of print adver­
tisements raise similar questions. The Agency again relies on 
the broad language of the statute's restricted device provisions 
to support these limitations, noting that the FDA enjoys the 
power to control the advertising of such products.l3G But the 
FDA has never attempted to impose restrictions of this sort on 
prescription drugs or restricted devices, and the Agency probably 
would not succeed if it tried.l37 
The proposals would have required that tobacco product 
manufacturers annually spend $150 million on a national educa­
tional campaign to discourage minors from using cigarettes and 
smokeless tobacco.l38 The final regulations do not include such 
a requirement, but the Agency clearly expressed its intention of 
separately requiring that companies engage in an educational 
campaign.l39 
advertising limitation on restricted devices in its entirety as follows: "Any advertise­
ment for a restricted device may not recommend or imply any use that is not in the 
labeling for the restricted device."), withdrawn, 46 Fed. Reg. 57,569 (1981). In fact, 
the FDA's authority over restricted device advertising actually may be somewhat less 
extensive than its existing authority over prescription drugs. See Dennis, supra note 
128, at 94. But cf. 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,407-08 (1996) (claiming greater authority 
over restricted devices); id. at 44,415 (arguing that its authority to regulate drug 
advertising is extensive) . 
. 134. See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(eX2Xi) (1996). 
135. See 21 C.F.R. § 897.34. 
136. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,406-07 ("The effectiveness of the restrictions on youth 
access would be substantially diminished if the manufacturers were free to entice 
children and adolescents to circumvent the access restrictions."). 
137. Courts have remanded overbroad FDA injunctions against promotional 
activities by drug manufacturers. See, e.g., United States v. Vitasafe Corp., 345 F.2d 
864, 870-71 (3d Cir. 1965). 
138. See 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314, 41,326-28 (1995) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 
§ 897.29) (proposed Aug. 11, 1995). Funding among the different manufacturers 
would have been in shares proportionate to their total respective advertising and 
promotional budgets, and the bulk of this extensive campaign would have to appear 
on television. 
139. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,538, 44,590; see also Timothy Noah, Clinton's Tobacco 
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Even if the restricted medical device categorization properly 
applies to tobacco products, it is not at all clear that an indus­
try-funded educational campaign would be permissible under the 
authority delegated by Congress. In its NPRM, the Agency cited 
several provisions of the Act in support of this requirement,140 
and it asserted that the various statutory provisions, taken in 
combination, would support this remedy.141 The FDA also not­
ed that courts have ratified its interpretation of the FD&C Act 
as giving it the authority to require dissemination of information 
regarding drug products.142 But the statute expressly forbids 
Rule Restricts Ads in Media Deemed Accessible to Minors, WAIL ST. J., Aug. 26, 
1996, at B2 ("FDA Commissioner David Kessler said he still anticipates the cam­
paign will consist largely of TV ads, and that it will cost between $100 million to 
$150 million."). 
140. Section 520(e) sets out the FDA's restricted device authority. See 21 U.S.C. 
§ 360j(e) (1994); see also supra Part II.C. Sections 502(a) and (q) of the Act provide 
that a device and a restricted device, respectively, are misbranded if their labeling is 
false or misleading in any particular. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(a), (q). Neither section, 
however, specifically authorizes the FDA to require corrective advertising or edu­
cational programs to correct misbranding. Section 201(n) of the Act instructs the 
Agency, in determining whether labeling or advertising is false or misleading, to 
consider "the extent to which the labeling or advertising fails to reveal facts materi­
al in the light of such representations or material with respect to consequences 
which may result from the use of the article." Id. § 321(n). The Act also contains a 
notification provision authorizing the Secretary, upon a determination that a device 
presents "an unreasonable risk of substantial harm to public health," to require 
notification to health professionals, device users, and others, of the risk involved, see 
id. § 360h(aX1).(2), but the Agency did not cite this section in support of its propos­
als, though it apparently discovered the potential utility of this provision during the 
course of the rulemaking process. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,538. 
141. 	 According to the FDA, the proposed campaign 
is consistent with these statutory provisions because it is intended to help en­
sure that cigarette and smokeless tobacco product advertising and labeling is 
not false or misleading and to counteract the appeal of these products previ­
ously created by advertising, thereby providing important, material information 
regarding the consequences of cigarette or smokeless tobacco product use by 
young people. 
60 Fed. Reg. 41,314, 41,351 (1995). 
142. See id. (citing Pharm. Mfrs. Ass'n v. FDA, 484 F. Supp. 1179, 1183-86 (D. 
Del.) (finding statutory authorization in FD&C Act §§ 201(n), 502(a), (0, & 701(a», 
affd, 634 F.2d 106 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam». In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 
the drug industry unsuccessfully challenged a proposed regulation requiring that a 
patient package insert (PPI) accomllany conjugated estrogen products. The decision 
concerned labeling, not advertising. IThe opinion focused on the FDA's authority over 
drug product labeling and the requi~ement that labels not be misleading. See Pharm. 
Mfrs. Ass'n, 484 F. Supp. at 1185.86. Although the FDA undoubtedly has authority 
~, drug ~d ",odioal de"" ,Ung, thi, authority doos ~t .....late into the 
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prior Agency approval of restricted device advertising. 143 
Perhaps in recognition of these weaknesses, the Agency 
dropped the educational campaign requirement from the final 
regulations. Nonetheless, the FDA announced that, because to­
bacco products now are subject to medical device requirements, 
it would employ its statutory authority to demand "notification" 
of hazards.144 The notification provision does not, however, 
support the FDA's effort to establish an industry-sponsored 
public education campaign. Congress authorized the FDA to re­
quire notification of users when substantial hazards with a mar­
keted device subsequently come to light.145 In effect, notifica­
tion would represent part of a recall strategy, for instance to 
advise physicians and patients of potential hazards and the 
possible need to replace an implanted device.146 The FDA's pro­
posed educational campaign would not simply advise existing 
device users of some newly discovered hazard but instead would 
attempt to discourage would-be users.147 
A few states currently sponsor public education programs. 
In 1988, voters in California approved a tax increase on tobacco 
products to finance a state-sponsored anti-smoking media cam­
paign.148 With the $150 million raised to date, the program has 
significantly reduced the number of smokers in the state.149 
power to demand corrective or educational advertising, particularly when such 
remedies are not specifically authorized by the statute. 
143. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(r) ("Except in extraordinary circumstances, no regulation 
issued under this paragraph [governing restricted devices] shall require prior approv­
al by the Secretary of the content of any advertisement . . . ."). 
144. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,538. 
145. See 21 U.S.C. § 360h(a) (authorizing the issuance of an order to notify 
health professionals and users if a device "presents an unreasonable risk of substan­
tial harm to public health" and if "no more practicable means is available . . • to 
eliminate such risk"); 49 Fed. Reg. 11,716 (1984) (announcing the availability of a 
draft guideline on Medical Device Notification and Voluntary Safety Alert). 
146. As the FDA itself notes, "section 518 of the act [21 U.S.C. § 360h] applies 
to the recall of a device, not its advertising." 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,437; cf. 21 U.S.C. 
§ 360h(eX1) (authorizing the issuance of a recall order including notification of 
health professionals). 
147. Elsewhere, in justifying an exemption from a statutory labeling requirement, 
the FDA explained that "the public health would not be advanced by requiring 
adequate directions for use." See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,465. 
148. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 30121-30130 (West 1994); Kennedy 
Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 806 P.2d 1360, 1362-67 (Cal. 1991) 
(rejecting challenges to Proposition 99l. 
149. See Michael Massing, How to Win the Tobacco War, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, July 
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Because the FDA clearly lacks the power to tax cigarettes to 
fund its own public education campaign,l50 the Agency must 
couch its unprecedented national program as a corrective adver­
tising requirement imposed througp. its authority to demand 
that device manufacturers notify users of substantial hazards. 
* * * * * 
More than thirty years ago, the FI'C's cigarette warning 
regulation prompted a more moderate legislative response.151 
The FDA may hope to trigger a similar response this time, as it 
did unwittingly two decades ago when it attempted to restrict 
sales of products sweetened with saccharin. In 1977, the FDA 
proposed prohibiting nearly all uses of saccharin because of a 
reported association with bladder cancer in animal studies.152 
Congress intervened in the rulemaking process by placing a 
moratorium on the Agency's proposed rule and requiring instead 
that food products containing saccharin include a warning la­
11, 1996, at 32, 36 ("This drive has had remarkable results. Californians have quit 
smoking at more than twice the national rate . . . . The rate of smoking among 
twelve- to seventeen-year-olds has not fallen as quickly, but, at nearly 11 percent, it 
is still roughly half that for the nation as a whole."); see also Bob Hohler, U.S. 
Examines State's Youth Tobacco Effort, White House May Model Program After 
Massachusetts Campaign, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 8, 1995, at 3 (describing a similar 
program in Massachusetts); Suein L. Hwang, Slick New Ads By Drug Firms Decry 
Smoking, WALL ST. J., May 21, 1996, at B1, B9 (describing the success of the 
California campaign and suggesting that a new wave of advertisements by compa­
nies marketing smoking cessation drug products also may succeed in encouraging 
efforts to quit). 
150. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (reserving for Congress the "Power To lay and 
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises"); 26 U.S.C. § 5701 (1994) (imposing 
federal taxes on cigarettes and other tobacco products). The FDA also could not 
exact a "user fee" without special statutory authorization. See National Cable Televi­
sion Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340-41 (1974). 
151. See supra notes 61-74 and accompanying text. More generally, after activist 
FTC behavior in the 1970s, see, e.g., National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 
F.2d 672, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1973), Congress amended the governing statute to clarify 
and constrain the Commission's rulemaking authority. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty­
Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 109(a), 88 Stat. 
2189 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2309 (1994»; see also JERRY L. MAsHAW ET AL., 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw: THE AMERICAN PuBLIC LAw SYSTEM 428-29 (3d ed. 1992) 
(describing subsequent congressional efforts to restrain the FTC). 
152. See 42 Fed. Reg. 19,996, 20,002 (1977). The Agency's proposal would have 
allowed saccharin to be marketed only as an OTC drug product and with an appro­
priate cancer warning on the label. See id. at 20,004. 
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bel.153 Perhaps a similar fate will befall the FDA's tobacco ini­
tiative, though this time Congress was content to await final­
ization of the proposals. 
The FDA's initiative appears vulnerable to judicial reversal 
on a variety of statutory grounds, though ultimately this may be 
entirely beside the point. The Agency may hope simply to 
prompt congressional action. From that perspective, judging by 
the industry's suggestions for a less burdensome legislative com­
promise, the initiative already represents a partial success.1M 
On the other hand, the FDA should not be free to ignore the 
outer boundaries of its delegated authority in pursuit of a well­
meaning crusade against a public health problem. Imagine that 
the Agency next decided to tackle handgun control or violence in 
children's television programming, secure in the knowledge that 
such an initiative might convince Congress to legislate a compro­
mise but would never survive long enough to undergo careful 
judicial scrutiny. Although these illustrations seem fanciful, 
FDA action might not be entirely frivolous or implausible under 
its broad statutory authority to regulate medical devices.l55 
153. See Saccharin Study and Labeling Act, Pub. L. No. 95-203, § 4, 91 Stat. 
1451, 1452 (1977) (codified at 21 u.s.c. § 343(oX1) (1994». The Act prohibits the 
Agency from (1) revoking or amending any interim food regulations applicable to 
saccharin, or (2) taking any other action to prohibit or restrict the sale or distribu­
tion of saccharin or any food, drugs, or cosmetics which lawfully contain saccharin 
solely on the basis of any carcinogenic or toxic effects revealed by studies available 
before the date of enactment. See id. § 3, 91 Stat. at 1452; see also Pub. L. No. 
102-142, tit. 6, 105 Stat. 878, 910 (1991) (extending moratorium until May 1, 1997); 
Richard A. Merrill & Michael R. Taylor, Saccharin: A Case Study of Government 
Regulation of Environmental Carcinogens, 5 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES LAw 1 (1985). 
154. See AIix M. Freedman & Suein L. Hwang, Legislation Plan on Tobacco Ad­
vances; WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 1996, at A2 (describing proposal which would strip the 
FDA of jurisdiction, enact many of the Agency's restrictions on access and advertis­
ing, and insulate manufacturers from tort liability in exchange for significant contri­
butions into an administrative compensation system); Suein L. Hwang & Timothy 
Noah, Tobacco: Philip Morris Proposes Curbs on Sales to Kids, WALL ST. J., May 16, 
1996, at B1 (describing an industry sponsored proposal for certain advertising 
restrictions in exchange for a provisi9n explicitly stripping the FDA of jurisdiction); 
see also Timothy Noah & Laurie McGinley, The FDA's David Kessler Savors Small 
Victory Against Tobacco, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 1996, at B1 (reporting that one 
company agreed to abide by most of the FDA's proposed restrictions as part of a 
settlement of tort claims brought against it). 
155. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (1994); supra note 104 (citing cases where the FDA 
asserted jurisdiction over products not generally thought of as medical devices); 
Gamerman, supra note 89, at 810-15; cf. Jeff Nesmith, House Refuses to Restore Gun 
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III. CONSEQUENCES OF A DEVICE DESIGNATION 
The classification of tobacco products as medical devic­
es-restricted or otherwise-will have significant implications 
wholly apart from the specific restrictions sought by the Agency 
at this point. Indeed, the FDA's announced plans to pursue the 
industry-sponsored educational campaign through its notifica­
tion authority demonstrate the potential breadth of the Agency's 
power over tobacco products once categorized as medical devices. 
Under the terms of the statute, medical device firms must com­
ply with a number of regulatory requirements governing product 
manufacturing and premarket clearance, many of which are not 
fully discussed in the preamble. Conversely, once subject to such 
requirements, device manufacturers may benefit from a powerful 
federal preemption defense to personal injury lawsuits. 
A. Compliance with Generally Applicable Device Requirements 
1. Adulteration and Misbranding Prohibitions.-At the out­
set, all device manufacturers must comply with a number of 
ongoing requirements. For example, once classified as medical 
devices, the statute's basic adulteration and misbranding prohi­
bitions would become fully applicable to tobacco products.1OO In 
Violence Study Funds, ATLANTA J. CONST., July 12, 1996, at 6A (describing congres­
sional criticism of the CDC's collection of data on deaths attributable to guns). Even 
so, any FDA initiatives in areas such as these would seem frivolous. With respect to 
handguns, for example, its own prior construction of the statutory definition would 
pose a serious but perhaps not insurmountable problem for the Agency, especially if 
it does not expect that it will ever have to defend its legal position in federal court. 
See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,619, 44,684-85 (1996) Gurisdictional statement) (disclaiming 
authority over guns); Public Sale of Protective Chemical Sprays: Hearing Before the 
Consumer Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 9lat Congo 36-37 (1969) 
(statement of William W. Goodrich, FDA Chief Counsel) (explaining that products 
such as guns and mace are not drugs or medical devices even though clearly intend­
ed to affect the structure or function of the body); Gamerman, supra note 89, at 853 
(suggesting a clarification of the definition of medical device to exclude items such 
as bullet-proof vests and guns, even though this is an area "into which FDA has not 
yet ventured"). 
156. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 351-352 (1994); United States v. Diapulse Corp. of Am., 
457 F.2d 25, 31 (2d Cir. 1972)' (affirming injunction against continued marketing of 
misbranded devices); United States v. Torigian Lab., Inc., 577 F. Supp. 1514, 1517 
(E.D.N.Y.) (upholding criminal conviction for device adulteration and misbranding), 
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particular, a drug-delivery device can be marketed only for use 
with an FDA-approved drug. Where an approved device is mar­
keted for use with an unapproved drug, the Agency has declared 
that the device is misbranded.157 
Under the Act, nicotine is a "new drug," the composition of 
which is not "generally recognized as safe" (GRAS) and is, there­
fore, not exempt from drug approval requirements.l58 The new 
drug definition contains a grandfather clause which provides 
that non-GRAS drugs previously subject to the 1906 predecessor 
of the FD&C Act will not be deemed new drugs.159 This 
provision would not, however, relieve nicotine of its NDA ob­
ligations because the grandfather clause does not apply once a 
product is relabeled,l60 and tobacco products necessarily would 
be relabeled under the Agency's medical device designation. 
Nicotine has been approved only for use in smoking cessation 
products and is unlikely ever to be approved for use in tobacco 
products classified as drug-delivery systems.16I 
affd mem., 751 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1984). 
157. See FDA Regulatory Letter No. 89-HFD-313-26 (Apr. 28, 1989), noted in 
HUTI' & MERRILL, supra note 35, at 749 (warning that an approved infusion pump 
was misbranded because its labeling promoted the pump for various unapproved 
uses of several approved drug products). Similarly, an approved general purpose 
medical device (such as a syringe) labeled for use with an unapproved drug (such as 
heroin) would violate the misbranding prohibitions of the Act. 
158. See, e.g., United States v. 50 Boxes More or Less, 909 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 
1990); Tri-Bio Lab., Inc. v. United States, 836 F.2d 135, 142 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding 
that the data presented were inadequate to find that an animal drug was generally 
recognized as safe); United States v. Articles of Drug, 826 F.2d 564, 573 (7th Cir. 
1987) (holding that certain toothpastes are "new drugs" under the FD&C Act); 
United States v. Undetermined Quantities of "Cal-Ban 3000 . . . ," 776 F. Supp. 
249, 256 (E.D.N.C. 1991) (holding that a weight loss product was a "new drug" 
under the FD&C Act). 
159. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(pX1). 
160. See id.; see also United States v. Allan Drug Corp., 357 F.2d 713, 719-20 
(10th Cir. 1966); F-D-C REPORTS ("The Pink Sheet"), July 4, 1994, at T&G-2 (de­
scribing successful enforcement actions against .iodinated glycerol, which manufac­
turers claimed to be exempt from new drug requirements under the grandfather 
provisions). 
161. Perhaps the closest parallel example is methadone, which is intended for use 
in the treatment of heroin addiction. See American Pharm. Ass'n v. Weinberger, 377 
F. Supp. 824, 829 n.9 (D.D.C. 1974) ("FDA's discretion under the Act's NDA provi­
sions is limited to either approving or denying NDA's and nowhere is FDA empow­
ered to approve an NDA upon the condition that the drug be distributed only 
through specified channels."), affd, 530 F.2d 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per curiam). The 
FDA revised its methadone regulations in response to this decision by deleting the 
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Other requirements include good manufacturing practice 
(GMP) controls,162 which are enforced through periodic in­
spections,163 and the reporting of adverse reactions to (or the 
malfunctioning of) medical devices.164 Under these regulations, 
manufacturers must report all information which suggests that 
a medical device may have caused or contributed to a death or 
serious injury.165 The FDA can order a mandatory recall of a 
medical device, and it can prohibit further marketing if there is 
a reasonable probability that continued distribution of the device 
would cause serious adverse health consequences or death.l66 
Thus, unless specifically exempted, tobacco manufacturers will 
have to submit an adverse reaction report each time a product­
related injury occurs. In the fmal tobacco regulations, the FDA 
has required that manufacturers submit reports only of unex­
pected adverse events and instances of contamination or changes 
in the manufacturing process.167 
restrictions on methadone distribution to pharmacies. See 41 Fed. Reg. 28,261 (1976). 
Unlike methadone, however, nicotine does not treat any medical condition unless it 
is used in a smoking cessation product to reduce withdrawal symptoms. 
162. See 21 U.S.C. § 360i; 21 C.F.R. pt. 820 (1996); see also 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 
44,411 (1996). 
163. See, e.g., In re Establishment Inspection of Medtronic, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 
536, 538-40 (D. Minn. 1980). The Agency regularly takes enforcement action against 
medical device manufacturers for GMP violations. See, e.g., United States v. Laerdal 
Mfg. Corp., 853 F. Supp. 1219, 1222-23, 1227-35 (D. Or. 1994), affd, 73 F.3d 852 
(9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Barr Lab., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 458, 465 (D.N.J. 
1993); United States v. Undetermined Quantities of Various Articles, 800 F. Supp. 
499, 502-03 (S.D. Tex. 1992); United States v. 789 Cases ... Surgeons' Gloves, 799 
F. Supp. 1275, 1287-93 (D.P.R. 1992). 
164. See 21 C.F.R. pt. 803. 
165. The regulations require a report whenever a· device manufacturer becomes 
aware of information "[i]n the medical or scientific literature, whether published or 
unpublished, that reasonably suggests that one of its marketed devices (A) may have 
caused or contributed to a death or serious injury." 21 C.F.R. § 803.24(aX2Xi). The 
regulation requires that device manufacturers report the adverse event by telephone 
within five calendar days of its occurrence, followed up by a written report within 
15 working days. See id. § 803.24(bX1). 
166. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 360e(e), 360h(e). Criminal penalties also may be imposed 
for failures to abide by the PMA requirements. See, e.g., United States v. C.R. Bard, 
Inc., 848 F. Supp. 287, 293 (D. Mass. 1994) (approving plea agreement imposing 
fines totalling more than $62 million). 
167. See 21 C.F.R. § 803.19(0. User facilities are entirely exempt, see id. 
§ 803.19(g), and distributors only need to report contamination, see id. § 804.25(c); 
see also 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,410-11. The FDA estimates that it will receive approxi­
mately fifty such reports per year. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,612. One manufacturer 
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The Agency notes the existence of most of these generally 
applicable medical device requirements;l68 however, the pream­
ble accompanying the final regulations provides few details 
about the consequences of applying these provisions. Instead, 
the FDA focuses on the "special" requirements it will apply to 
tobacco products. The Agency may be hoping to finesse the issue 
and avoid actually applying these other provisions,169 but the 
regulations do not specifically exempt tobacco products from 
many of these medical device requirements, nor is it clear that 
the FDA even has the authority to permit such an exclusion.170 
2. Classification and Approval for Marketing.-In addition 
to these general controls, all medical devices must be classified 
by the FDA.l7l In classifying a device, the FDA must consider 
the persons for whose use the device is intended, the conditions 
of intended use, and it must "weigh[] any probable benefit to 
health from the use of the device against any probable risk of 
injury or illness from such use."172 Under this classification 
recently recalled billions of cigarettes because of possible chemical contamination. See 
Inquiry Sees Nothing Unusual in Batch of Recalled Cigarettes, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 29, 
1996, at A9. 
168. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,404, 44,409-11, 44,540 (noting that tobacco product 
manufacturers will have "to comply with the existing device registration and listing 
requirements," but that distributors are exempt); 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314, 41,352 (1995) 
(conceding that, "[als devices, the products would also be subject to various pre­
existing requirements in the statute and regulations," including general labeling re­
quirements for devices, establishment registration and device listing requirements, 
and good manufacturing practice requirements). 
169. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,404 ("Although FDA intends to impose on cigarettes 
and smokeless tobacco all requirements applicable to devices, the act does not 
provide that these requirements should all be imposed immediately."). 
170. See infra notes 186-190 and accompanying text; cf. 21 U.S.C. § 336 (autho­
rizing the FDA to ignore minor statutory violations); Monsanto Co. v. Kennedy, 613 
F.2d 947, 954-55 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (finding that FDA enjoyed inherent discretion to 
apply a de minimis exception); United States v. 449 Cases, Containing Tomato 
Paste, 212 F.2d 567, 575 (2d Cir. 1954); United States v. General Foods Corp., 446 
F. Supp. 740, 746 (N.D.N.Y. 1978). 
171. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(aX1XC); 21 C.F.R. pt. 860; see also General Medical 
Co. v. FDA, 770 F.2d 214, 216-17 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (summarizing classification proce­
dure); Contact Lens Mfrs. Ass'n v. FDA, 766 F.2d 592, 599-603 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(same); Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, lOlst 
Congo 1 (1990) (describing the Medical Device Amendments' (MDA) "three-tiered 
scheme that regulated medical devices according to their risk"). 
172. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(aX2). 
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system, tobacco products would fall into Class III as extremely 
hazardous devices.173 
Second, manufacturers of medical devices must obtain some 
sort of premarket clearance for their products. When it recently 
announced plans to introduce a smokeless cigarette, one compa­
ny expressed concerns that the FDA would demand that the 
product undergo a protracted premarket review procedure.174 
Premarket approval (PMA) represents the most rigorous 
clearance requirement and eventually will be required for all 
Class III medical devices.175 The PMA is essentially a product 
license which imposes precise conditions governing the manu­
facture and labeling of a device and from which no deviation is 
permitted.176 Under the PMA provisions, all devices must be 
tested for safety and effectiveness, usually under an investiga­
tional device exemption (IDE).177 The PMA application must 
contain, among other things, a description of the device and its 
principles of operation, manufacturing methods and controls, 
labeling and directions for use, and detailed test data, including 
clinical data from controlled studies in humans, demonstrating 
the product's safety and effectiveness.178 When the FDA issues 
a PMA, it has decided that the device is safe and effective (and 
173. See id. § 360c(aXIXCXiiXII) (requiring a Class III designation for devices 
which "present[] a potential unreasonable risk of illness or i~ury"); see also 61 Fed. 
Reg. at 44,411-13 (conceding that tobacco products eventually will be classified but 
suggesting that it might avoid a Class III designation by taking into account the 
negative public health consequences of a prohibition). In 1977 and 1978, a public 
interest group filed citizen petitions requesting that the FDA assert jurisdiction over 
attached and detached cigarette filters as medical devices, based on a recommenda­
tion by an advisory committee that they be classified as Class 111 devl.ces. See 'H.UTI 
& MERRILL, supra note 35, at 384. T\le Agency refused to regulate either type of 
cigarette filter as a medical device absent any therapeutic labeling claims. See 47 
Fed. Reg. 31,130, 31,132 (1982); see also Study Hints of Lung Danger in Cigarettes, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1995, at A12 (reporting on a recent study which revealed that 
pieces of cigarette filters break off during use and become lodged in the lungs). 
174. See Feder, supra note 36, at A7. 
175. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(aXIXCXiiXII); 21 C.F.R. § 814.1(c); see also United 
States v. Various Articles of Device ... , 814 F. Supp. 32, 33 (E.D. Tenn. 1992). 
176. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 351(0(1), 360e; 21 C.F.R. § 814.80 ("A device may not be 
manufactured, packaged, stored, labeled, distributed, or advertised in a manner that 
is inconsistent with any conditions to approval specified in the PMA approval order 
for the device."); Ethicon, Inc. v. FDA, 762 F. Supp. 382, 384 n.2 (D.D.C. 1991) 
("Pre-market approval involves the most rigorous review of devices under the Act."). 
177. See 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g); 21 C.F.R. § 812. 
178. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c); 21 C.F.R. § 814. 
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not adulterated or misbranded) as long as it complies with the 
conditions specified in the application. 
Even if the Agency regarded tobacco products as 
"grandfathered" Class III devices temporarily exempt from PMA 
requirements, § 510(k) of the FD&C Act requires the submission 
of a premarket notification (PMN).179 With the exception of cer­
tain Class I devices for which the FDA does not require a PMN, 
and Class III devices for which the Agency requires the submis­
sion of PMAs, medical devices may be marketed only if they 
were introduced before May 28, 1976, or are "substantially 
equivalent" to a device marketed before that date.ISO A PMN 
would be required each time a company introduces a new prod­
uct or design,181 and it must include proposed labeling and an 
explanation of how the device is substantially equivalent in in­
tended use and technological characteristics to a particular pred­
icate device.182 The FDA reviews PMN submissions to ensure 
that the new device is substantially equivalent to an identified 
predicate device. After a substantial equivalence determination 
has been made by the FDA, the device may be marketed. If 
significant changes later are made to the device, either a supple­
ment to the original PMN or a brand new PMN is required. l83 
The 510(k) notification must either contain an adequate 
179. See 21 u.s.C. § 360(k); 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,410, 44,463 (1996). 
180. See 21 u.S.C. § 360c{i) (defining "substantially equivalent" as having the 
same intended uses and the same technological characteristics as the predicate 
device); 21 C.F.R. § 807.81 (same). If the new device has different technological 
characteristics, the PMN must contain information, including clinical data, dem­
onstrating that the device is as safe and effective as a legally marketed predicate 
device. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c{i); see also 21 C.F.R. § 807.100; 57 Fed. Reg. 58,400, 
58,403 (1992). 
181. See 21 C.F.R. § 807.81(aX3). 
182. See id. § 807.87 (detailing required elements of a PMN submission). In the 
case of a Class II device subject to a performance standard, the manufacturer must 
demonstrate that the device conforms to any such standard. See 21 U.S.C. § 360d; 
21 C.F.R. § 807.87(d). The FDA may establish performance standards "to provide 
reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the device." 21 U.S.C. 
§ 360d(aX1). A performance standard may include provisions regarding construction, 
ingredients, testing, or measurement of the device's performance, and such a stan­
dard may restrict the sale and distribution of the device to the extent permitted in 
the restricted device provisions of the Act. See id. § 360d(aX2). 
183. See 21 C.F.R. § 807.81(aX3); 42 Fed. Reg. 42,520, 42,522 (1977); United 
States v. An Article of Device Consisting of 1,217 Cardboard Boxes, 607 F. Supp. 
990, 996·97 (W.D. Mich. 1985); see also 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,612 (1996) (estimat­
ing that there are presently 1,000 varieties of tobacco products on the market). 
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summary of any information concerning safety and effectiveness, 
including adverse health effects, or state that such information 
will be made available to any person upon request. l84 When 
the Agency receives a PMN that it regards as incomplete, it may 
request additional information. The failure to include adequate 
evidence of safety and effectiveness may result in a finding that 
a device is not "substantially equivalent" to a predicate device. 
In addition, the Agency has demanded that manufacturers pro­
vide clinical data to support their claims that any technological 
changes did not impact safety and effectiveness.l85 
In partial recognition of these hurdles, the FDA noted in its 
proposal that "on occasion the agency has choseri not to use 
premarket approval for critical devices that potentially raise 
significant safety and efficacy issues" even though approval 
provides the greatest regulatory control,l86 adding that agen­
cies enjoy significant discretion in enforcement matters, as rec­
ognized by the Supreme Court in Heckler v. Chaney.187 Al­
though the Court in that case upheld the FDA's decision not to 
enforce premarket approval requirements for lethal injection 
drugs,l86 that situation is not analogous to the regulation of 
tobacco products as medical devices. The decision in Chaney 
184. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(lXAXiiXI), (3XA); 21 C.F.R. § 807.93. 
185. See H.R. REp. No. 101-808, at 25 (1990); Richard M. Cooper, Clinical Data 
under Section 501(k), 42 FOOD DRUG COSMo L.J. 192 (1987); Ellen J. Flannery, The 
Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990: An Overview, 46 FOOD DRUG COSMo L.J. 129, 131 
(1991). 
186. See 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314, 41,349 (1995) (stating that premarket approval is 
generally regarded as providing the greatest regulatory control, but that other 
regulations would be more appropriate). As further precedent, the FDA points to its 
recent announcement that it will no longer enforce PMA requirements for heart 
valve allografts. See id. (citing 59 Fed. Reg. 52,078 (1994». In fact, the Agency had 
little choice in the matter. See Northwest Tissue Ctr. V. Shalala, 1 F.3d 522, 536 
(7th Cir. 1993) (remanding to district court to determine whether FDA gave ade­
quate notice to heart valve allograft distributors that these products were included 
in a rule subjecting replacement heart valves to PMA requirements); Alabama Tissue 
Ctr. V. Sullivan, 975 F.2d 373, 379 (7th Cir. 1992) (including heart valve allografts 
in definition of biologic valves under FDA rule). The Agency subsequently withdrew 
the rule applying PMA requirements to valve allografts. See 59 Fed. Reg. 52,078 
(1994). Wholly apart from judicial compulsion, it is difficult to see how the FDA can 
view an action relaxing regulatory controls on a dangerous but medically useful 
product as analogous to its proposal to regulate tobacco products (which have no 
medical benefits) under the "flexible" medical device provisions. 
187. 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
188. See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 837. 
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applies when the Agency imposes statutory requirements on a 
product but then, in its discretion, chooses not to enforce these 
requirements. In the case of tobacco products, however, the FDA 
apparently intends to decline imposing certain mandatory device 
requirements on tobacco products at the outset.lS9 The Agency 
cannot forever ignore Congress' statutory directives.l90 
3. Disclosure of Trade Secret Information.-The application 
of these various medical device requirements to tobacco products 
also may result in the disclosure of information currently pro­
tected as trade secrets. Pursuant to the cigarette labeling stat­
ute, manufacturers must submit annual ingredient lists to HHS, 
but the lists need not specifically identify the company or the 
brand of cigarettes.191 All information submitted under the 
statute is considered trade secret information,I92 and federal 
189. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,416 (1996). The statute requires, for example, 
that "the Secretary shall classify all such devices . . . into the classes" established 
by the Act. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(bX1) (1994) (emphasis added); see also id. §§ 360(k) 
(premarket notification requirement), 360i(a) (adverse event reporting). Where the 
statute is not drawn in mandatory terms, of course, the FDA is free to exempt 
certain devices from general controls. See 60 Fed. Reg. 59,557, 59,560 (1995) (de­
scribing recent exemptions of several low-risk devices from such general controls); cf. 
Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (upholding FDA regulation 
exempting biowarfare vaccines from IND requirements under certain limited circum­
stances); Jeffrey M. Sellers, Note, Regulatory Values and the Exceptions Process, 93 
YALE L.J. 938, 957 (1984). 
190. See, e.g., Cutler v. Hayes, 818 F.2d 879, 895 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("Although 
FDA's discretion extends to review of OTe drugs by ingredient rather than by 
product . . . the agency lacks authority to simply do nothing to effectuate the 
purpose of the Act."); Cutler v. Kennedy, 475 F. Supp. 838, 854 (D.D.C. 1979) ('The 
Commissioner's OTC regulations formally authorize the continued marketing of 
Category III drug products in the absence of an administrative determination that 
those products are, today, generally recognized by experts as safe and effective. That 
flies in the face of the statutory scheme."); id. at 856 ("FDA may not lawfully 
maintain Category III in any form in which drugs with Category III conditions . . . 
are exempted from enforcement action. Informally, of course, the FDA will be free to 
exercise its discretion . . . not to seek enforcement actions."); see also Ronald M. 
Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 689, 
753-79 (1990) (canvassing various limitations on an agency's discretion not to act). 
191. See 15 U.S.C. § 1335a(a) (1994); see also Mark A. Rothstein, Refusing to 
Employ Smokers: Good Public Health or Bad Public Policy?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
940, 943 (1987) ('Tobacco smoke contains between three thousand and four thousand 
chemicals, more than twenty of which have been shown to cause cancer or tumors."). 
No reports on other tobacco products or on tobacco injuries or deaths are required. 
192. See 15 U.S.C. § 1335a(bX2XA). 
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officials cannot disclose any of the ingredients except to Con­
gress.193 
At least two of the generally applicable medical device regu­
lations arguably would require that manufacturers of tobacco 
products disclose ingredient information. First, a PMN submis­
sion requires specification of the "material[s] used" in the de­
vice.l94 Second, GMP controls require that manufacturers 
maintain a "device master record" available to inspectors which 
must contain the device's "formulation" and information about 
components.195 Both of ,these regulations provide that the re­
quired information will be kept confidential only to the extent 
authorized by the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).l96 The 
FDA's implementing regulations define trade secrets as "infor­
mation which is used in one's business and is of a type custom­
arily held in strict confidence or regarded as privileged and not 
disclosed to any member of the public by the person to whom it 
belongs."197 Because tobacco companies regularly submit ingre­
193. The Secretary of HHS is empowered to report to Congress any research 
findings or other information which suggest that one or more of the listed ingredi­
ents poses a health risk to smokers. See id. § 1335a(bXl); see also Barbara Carton, 
Tobacco: State Demands List of Contents for Cigarettes, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 1996, 
at Bl (describing passage of ingredient disclosure law in Massachusetts and tobacco 
industry plans to challenge it as inconsistent with trade secret protection under 
federal law). 
194. See 21 C.F.R. § 807.92(aX4) (1996) (requiring a description of the device, 
"including an explanation of how the device functions" and "the significant physi­
cal . . . characteristics of the device, such as device design [and] material[s] used"). 
It should be noted, however, that these requirements "have been modified to reflect 
the agency's intention that trade secret and confidential commercial information be 
protected." 59 Fed. Reg. 64,287, 64,289 (1994) (adding that the 510(k) summary 
should be provided "in a form that is clear, concise, and adequate, but not so 
detailed as to disclose trade secret information"). 
195. See 21 C.F.R. § 820.181(a); 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,540-41 (1996) (explaining 
the scope of the FDA's authority to inspect records); see also id. at 44,463-64 (dis­
cussing the inapplicability of trade secret protection but declining to impose ingredi­
ent labeling requirements). 
196. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(bX4) (1994); see also 21 C.F.R. § 20.61(c) (providing that 
data and information submitted to the FDA which fall within definitions of trade 
secret or confidential commercial information are not available for public disclosure 
under FOIA); Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 975 F.2d 
871, 877-78 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en bane). FOIA also exempts from disclosure other 
information if a different statute requires that it be withheld from the public. See 5 
U.S.C. § 552(bX3). The cigarette labeling statute, however, only prohibits the disclo­
sure of ingredient information submitted to HHS under that particular reporting re­
quirement. See 15 U.S.C. § 1335a(bX2XA) (1994). 
197. 21 C.F.R. § 20.61(b); see also Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 
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dient information to their trade association, it may be difficult to 
argue that this data qualifies for trade secret protection. Thus, if 
generally applicable medical device provisions will apply to to­
bacco products under the new FDA regulations, then the effect 
may be to circumvent the special trade secret provisions current­
ly applicable to ingredient lists. 
***** 
At this juncture, the FDA has not been fully candid about 
the possible consequences of applying all of these medical device 
requirements to cigarettes. If the Agency decides that tobacco 
product manufacturers need to comply with only a small subset 
of the requirements applicable to all other devices, public inter­
est groups undoubtedly will challenge the failure to enforce 
those other requirements.l98 Moreover, even if the Agency were 
properly exercising its discretion by not enforcing the other pro­
visions of the statute, the tobacco industry has no assurances 
that this policy would continue; absent an exemption formalized 
in the final rule, the FDA could easily change its mind and bring 
enforcement actions at a later date. The Agency's assertion of 
jurisdiction over cigarettes as medical devices logically carries 
with it the application of all medical device regulatory require­
ments to manufacturers of tobacco products. 
B. The Preemption Dimension 
Perhaps the most alarming possible consequence of the 
Agency's decision to regulate tobacco products using its authori­
ty over medical devices is the added protection against tort lia­
704 F.2d 1280, 1290-91 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that commercial information could 
be given confidentiality if its disclosure would "cause substantial harm to the com­
petitive position of the person from whom the information was obtained"). 
198. Cf. Action on Smoking & Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 243 (D.C. Cir. 
1980) (upholding the FDA's rejection of a public interest group's citizen petition 
requesting that cigarettes be regulated as drugs); Public Citizen v. Commissioner of 
FDA, 724 F. Supp. 1013, 1019-20 (D.D.C. 1989) (ordering the FDA to promulgate 
tampon absorbency labeling regulations within two months, and criticizing the FDA's 
seven-year delay in issuing these regulations); Public Citizen v. Heckler, 653 F. 
Supp. 1229, 1241 (D.D.C. 1986) (granting petition for review where the FDA had 
rejected requests that it regulate raw milk). 
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bility that this may give manufacturers. Unlike most other in­
dustries subject to FDA regulation, device manufacturers cur­
rently benefit from a statutory provision expressly preempting 
nonidentical state requirements.l99 Almost without exception, 
lower courts have held that this provision preempts tort claims 
to the extent that the FDA regulates a particular device,2OO and 
the Supreme Court's latest decision on this question simply 
demands that the Agency requirement be specific to the device 
in question.201 By contrast, cigarette manufacturers heretofore 
have enjoyed a substantially more limited preemption defense 
against products liability claims. 
1. The Existing Defense Against Failure-to-Warn 
Claims.-Since 1965, Congress has prescribed the warnings that 
must appear on the labels of cigarette packages.202 At present, 
cigarette manufacturers are protected from inconsistent state la­
beling regulations so long as they comply with the federal warn­
ing statute.203 In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,204 the Su­
199. 	 The statute provides in relevant part as follows: 
000 State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in 
effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement­
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable 
under this chapter to the device, and . 
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any 
other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this 
chapter. 
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994). This provision was part of the MDA enacted in 1976. 
See Pub. L. No. 94-295, § 2, 90 Stat. 540, 574. A limited class of FDA food labeling 
requirements also expressly preempt state law. See 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a). 
200. See Lars Noah, Amplification of Federal Preemption in Medical Device Cases, 
49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 183, 199-200 (1994). A number of courts have found that no 
claims are preempted because a particular device is not regulated by FDA. See, e.g., 
Anguiano v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 44 F.3d 806, 810 (9th Cir. 1995); 
Oliver v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 251, 253-55 (W.D. Pa. 1994). Only 
a few have held that tort claims are never preempted. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Collagen 
Corp., 67 F.3d 1453, 1458-59 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2579 (1996); 
Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc., 642 N.E.2d 206, 215 (III. App. 1994), affd, 662 N.E.2d 
1248 (III. 1996); see also Robert S. Adler & Richard A. Mann, Preemption and 
Medical Devices: The Courts Run Amok, 59 Mo. L. REV. 895, 916-42 (1994) (criticiz­
ing trend toward finding express preemption of common law claims). 
201. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2255-58 (1996). Four members 
of the Court suggested that the MDA does not preempt any tort claims. See id. at 
2251-53, 2259 (plurality) .. 
202. See supra Part TI.A.2. 
203. See 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994) ("No requirement or prohibition based on 
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preme Court held that this statute also expressly preempts prod­
ucts liability actions grounded on failure-to-warn (but not other) 
claims, even though the provision did not explicitly delineate 
any such claims as subject to preemption.205 Justice Stevens, 
writing for himself and three other members of the Court on this 
question, focused on the breadth of the statutory phrase "re­
quirement or prohibition," concluding that it "sweeps broadly 
and suggests no distinction between positive enactments and 
common law; to the contrary, those words easily encompass 
obligations that take the form of common-law rules.,,206 
Justice Stevens proceeded to evaluate each of plaintiff's 
claims to determine whether it was preempted. First, he found 
preemption of the failure-to-warn claim.207 The plaintiff's ex-
smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertis· 
ing or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity 
with the provisions of this chapter."); Bee also Vango Media, Inc. v. City of New 
York, 34 F.3d 68, 75 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that city ordinance mandating certain 
warnings in cigarette advertisements was preempted by federal law). 
204. 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (plurality). 
205. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 525-29 (Stevens, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., 
White, and O'Connor, JJ.) (concluding that breach of "express warranty and certain 
fraudulent misrepresentation claims were not preempted). Two other Justices found 
an even broader preemptive effect in the statute and would have held all common 
law claims preempted under the 1969 amendment. See id. at 544-56 (Scalia, J., 
joined by Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The remaining 
three Justices would have held none of the claims preempted. See id. at 534-44 
(Blackmun, J., joined by Kennedy and Souter, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). Because the Court was fragmented on the preemptive force of the 1969 
provision, "and no single rationale explaining the result enjoy[ed] the assent of five 
Justices," the holding may be viewed as the position taken by those concurring on 
the narrowest grounds. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977); Bee 
also Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1926 (1994) ("This test is more easily 
stated than applied to the various opinions supporting the result in" a particular 
case.). 
206. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521-22 (Stevens, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White, 
and O'Connor, JJ.) ("[C]ommon-Iaw damages actions of the sort raised by petitioner 
are premised on the existence of a legal duty, and it is difficult to say that such 
actions do not impose 'requirements or prohibitions."'); see also CSX Transp., Inc. v. 
Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 1737 (1993). 
207. 	 See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524-25. The Court stated that: 
Thus, insofar as claims under either failure-to-warn theory require a showing 
that respondents' post-1969 advertising or promotions should have included 
additional, or more clearly stated, warnings, those claims are pre-empted. The 
Act does not, however, pre-empt petitioner's claims that rely solely on 
respondents' testing or research practices or other actions unrelated to adver­
tising or promotion. 
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press warranty claim was not, however, preempted because the 
imposition of liability would arise from the breach of "a contrac­
tual commitment voluntarily undertaken" by the warrantor 
rather than from a violation of any requirement imposed under 
state law.208 Justice Stevens then subdivided plaintiffs 
fraudulent misrepresentation claim into two distinct theories: 
one alleging that the companies' advertising neutralized the 
effect of the warnings mandated by Congress, a claim which was 
preempted just as the failure-to-warn claim,209 and one alleg­
ing violations of a more general duty not to conceal material 
facts, a claim which was not preempted "insofar as those claims 
rely on a state law duty to disclose such facts through channels 
of communication other than advertising or promotion."210 
Thus, Cipollone only preempts a limited subset of tort 
claims involving cigarettes. For instance, Justice Stevens noted 
that the statute would not preempt claims alleging defects in 
manufacturing or product design.211 In addition, plaintiffs su­
ing cigarette manufacturers have managed to elude Cipollone by 
recasting inadequate warning claims as, for example, fraud or 
breach of express warranty.212 Finally, Cipollone provides no 
Id. 
208. See id. at 526. "[Al contractual requirement, although only enforceable under 
state law, is not 'imposed' by the State, but rather is 'imposed' by the contracting 
party upon itself." Id. at 526 n.24; see also American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 115 S. 
Ct. 817, 824-26 (1995) (holding that Airline Deregulation Act did not preempt breach 
of contract claims involving frequent flyer program). 
209. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 527-28 ("Such a claim is predicated on a state-law 
prohibition against statements in advertising and promotional materials that tend to 
minimize the health hazards associated with smoking."). "In this light it seems quite 
clear that petitioner's first theory of fraudulent misrepresentation is inextricably 
related to petitioner's first failure-to-warn theory, a theory that we have already con­
cluded is largely pre-empted by § 5(b)." Id. at 528. 
210. Id. "State-law prohibitions on false statements of material fact do not create 
'diverse, nonuniform, and confusing' standards. Unlike state law obligations concern­
ing the warning necessary to render a product 'reasonably safe,' state-law proscrip­
tions on intentional fraud rely only on a single, uniform standard: falsity." Id. at 
529. Similarly, Justice Stevens took the position that the plaintiffs conspiracy to 
commit such fraud was not preempted. See id. at 530. 
211. See id. at 523. 
212. See, e.g., Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 870 F. Supp. 1425, 1432-34 (E.D. 
La. 1994) (rejecting preemption defense against fraud and deceit, negligent misrepre­
sentation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, violation of consumer protection 
statutes, breach of express and implied warranties, negligent manufacturing and 
design, and strict liability claims); Grinnell v. American Tobacco Co., 883 S.W.2d 
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defense for manufacturers of smokeless tobacco products.213 
2. Broader Preemption for Device Manufacturers.-Both 
before and after Cipollone, express preemption as a defense to 
tort liability has arisen most frequently in products liability 
litigation against manufacturers of medical devices. Congress 
expressed an even broader intent to preempt state laws applica­
ble to medical devices than the provision at issue in Cipollone. 
The 1969 legislation only preempted requirements or prohibi­
tions related to the promotion of cigarettes.214 By comparison, 
the MDA preempts any state medical device requirement which 
is different from or in addition to an applicable FDA require­
ment and "which relates to" either the safety or effectiveness of 
the device or "any other matter included in a requirement appli­
cable to the device under this chapter."215 
For instance, courts have dismissed claims against tampon 
manufacturers for failure to warn of toxic shock syndrome be­
cause the FDA imposes specific warning requirements for these 
products.216 More recent preemption decisions involving med­
ical devices are even more sweeping, holding that premarket 
approval by the Agency defeats a variety of common law claims 
including those alleging defective design, testing, manufacture, 
or labeling.217 Courts have been only slightly more hesitant to 
791, 797-98 (Tex. App. 1994) (same); cf. Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 875 
P.2d 73, 80-83 (Cal.) (holding that claim for violation of state consumer protection 
statute was not preempted), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 577 (1994); Kyte v. Philip 
Morris, Inc., 556 N.E.2d 1025, 1030 (Mass. 1990) (rejecting preemption defense to 
claims by minors addicted to cigarettes alleging breach of implied warranty and 
violation of state consumer protection statute). 
213. The Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act preempts only 
state statutes or regulations. See 15 U.S.C. § 4406(b), (c) (1994) ("Nothing in this 
chapter shall relieve any person from liability at common law or under State statu­
tory law to any other person."); see also Marsee v. United States Tobacco Co., 639 F. 
Supp. 466 (W.D. Okla. 1986) (describing products liability claims brought against the 
manufacturer of a smokeless tobacco product), affd, 866 F.2d 319 (10th Cir. 1989). 
214. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 530-3l. 
215. See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994); see also Noah, supra note 200, at 184-88. 
216. See National Bank of Commerce v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 38 F.3d 988, 990­
92 (8th Cir. 1994); Moore v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 867 F.2d 243, 246-47 (5th Cir. 
1989). 
217. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1268, 1280-81 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(injectable collagen), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2576 (1996); Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 
1316, 1324-31 (3d Cir.) (artificial heart valve), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 67 (1995); 
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find preemption of tort claims against manufacturers of devices 
distributed without full premarket approval, such as those being 
used in clinical trials pursuant to the FDA's investigational de­
vice exemption,21s or devices cleared for marketing under 
§ 510(k) as substantially equivalent to an existing product,219 
though the Supreme Court has now significantly restricted the 
scope of preemption in the latter situation.22o 
Although no court has suggested that federal law preempts 
all tort claims against all devices, there is a growing consensus 
that such claims are preempted to the extent that the FDA regu­
lates a particular device, whether through published regulations 
or the individualized review and approval of applications to 
market a medical device. These decisions are more expansive 
than Cipollone. For instance, a few courts have held that breach 
of express warranty claims are preempted.221 Indeed, a number 
of lower courts have found sweeping preemption of tort claims 
even in instances where the manufacturer has failed to comply 
Martello v. CIBA Vision Corp., 42 F.3d 1167, 1169 (8th Cir. 1994) (contact lens 
solution), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2614 (1995); King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 
1130, 1133-36 (1st Cir. 1993) (injectable collagen); Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 
F.2d 1416, 1421-25 (5th Cir. 1993) (injectable collagen). But see Kennedy v. Collagen 
Corp., 67 F.3d 1453, 1458-59 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the MDA never preempts 
tort claims, refusing to follow the consensus position of the other circuits), cert. 
denied, 116 S. Ct. 2579 (1996). 
218. See, e.g., Martin v. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 70 F.3d 39, 41-42 (6th Cir. 
1995) (pacemaker), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2576 (1996); Becker v. Optical Radiation 
Corp., 66 F.3d 18, 20-21 (2d Cir. 1995) (intraocular lenses); Gile v. Optical Radiation 
Corp., 22 F.3d 540, 541-42 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 429 (1994); Duncan v. 
IOLAB Corp., 12 F.3d 194 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam); Slater v. Optical Radiation 
Corp., 961 F.2d 1330, 1333 (7th Cir. 1992); Hunsaker v. Surgidev Corp., 818 F. 
Supp. 744, 753 (M.D. Pa. 1992), affd mem., 5 F.3d 1489 (3d Cir. 1993). 
219. See, e.g., English v. Mentor Corp., 67 F.3d 477, 481-83 (3d Cir. 1995) (penile 
prosthesis), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996); Duvall v. Bristol-Myers-Squibb Co., 65 
F.3d 392, 398-401 (4th Cir. 1995) (penile prosthesis), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996); 
Reeves v. AcroMed Corp., 44 F.3d 300, 305-07 (5th Cir.) (metal bone plate and 
screws), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2251 (1995); Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13, 
17-19 (1st Cir. 1994) (pacemaker); cf. Feldt v. Mentor Corp., 61 F.3d 431, 436-38 
(5th Cir. 1995) (premarket clearance would preempt warning and manufacturing but 
not design defect claims), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996). 
220. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2255-58 (1996) (holding that 
none of the products liability claims against a pacemaker manufacturer were pre­
empted because the generic premarket notification, good manufacturing practice, and 
labeling regulations did not impose any specific FDA requirements on the device). 
221. See Martin, 70 F.3d at 42; Duvall, 65 F.3d at 400-01; Martello, 42 F.3d at 
1169; King, 983 F.2d at 1135-36. But see Mitchell, 67 F.3d at 1285. 
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with FDA requirements.222 
The FDA's new advertising and labeling restrictions might 
preempt failure-to-warn and related claims against manufactur­
ers of both cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products. If tobacco 
companies file premarket notifications in the future, courts may 
hold that certain design defect and other labeling claims are 
preempted, notwithstanding the Medtronic decision.223 Even 
the specific application of medical device GMP requirements to 
tobacco products could preempt manufacturing defect claims.224 
The FDA surely does not intend to protect manufacturers in 
this manner.225 Indeed, the Agency has previously expressed 
its disagreement with any preemption of tort claims against 
device manufacturers,226 but it has not yet persuaded the 
courts. The tobacco industry mayor may not recognize the po­
tential benefits of a medical device approach to regulation, but it 
certainly has not broached the subject in public.227 
222. See, e.g., Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 63 F.3d 25, 30-31 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. 
dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 1892 (1996); Michael, 46 F.3d at 1328-29; Reeves, 44 F.3d at 
307. For an argument that these courts have seriously misinterpreted Cipollone in 
this respect, see Lars Noah, Reconceptualizing Federal Preemption of Tort Claims as 
the Government Standards Defense, 37 WM. & MARy L. REV. 903 (1996). The Su­
preme Court recently suggested that the defense would not apply in such circum­
stances. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2255; id. at 2264 (O'Connor, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
223. See Lars Noah, The Pre-emption Morass, LEGAL TIMES, July 29, 1996, at 
S37 (explaining the limited scope of the plurality's decision); Noah, supra note 200, 
at 208-10 (suggesting meaningful differences in the PMN review process before and 
after 1990). 
224. See Duvall, 65 F.3d at 399; Mendes, 18 F.3d at 19 (holding that "plaintiffs 
negligent manufacturing claim (including her allegations of negligent manufacturing, 
control, maintenance, inspection, testing, servicing, distribution, and sale of the 
device) is preempted by FDA regulations on good manufacturing practices"). 
225. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,550 (1996) ("FDA does not expect any of these 
Federal requirements to preempt any tort claims relating to tobacco products."). 
226. In one recent appeal, the Department of Justice filed an amicus curiae brief, 
explaining the FDA's opposition to preemption in this case. See Brief for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae, Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 63 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 1995) (No. 
94-1951), noted in 22 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 1230 (1994). Indeed, as 
suggested in the brief, the Agency does not believe that the MDA ever preempts 
common law claims. Id. at 14 n.5; see also Duvall, 65 F.3d at 401 n.9. Although 
courts will defer to agency interpretations against statutory preemption, see Ameri­
can Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817, 821-22, 824-25 (1995), the FDA cannot 
quite so easily disavow in litigation papers what appears to be a formal and long­
standing construction of the statute, see Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 
204, 212-13 (1988). 
227. C{. Product Liability Standards: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Com­
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS TO THE REGULATIONS 
The industry already has filed lawsuits challenging the 
proposed restrictions as inconsistent with both the statute and 
the First Amendment.228 In seeking to prevent tobacco compa­
nies from encouraging illegal tobacco use by minors, the FDA's 
advertising restrictions will affect "commercial speech" signifi­
cantly. The Agency also proposes to require industry-wide partic­
ipation in an educational campaign directed at potential and 
actual underage tobacco users. This aspect of the initiatives will 
be even more vulnerable to legal challenge under the First 
Amendment than some of the other advertising and point-of-sale 
limitations. 
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public 
Service Commission,229 the Supreme Court developed a four­
part test to determine whether a restriction on commercial 
speech exceeds First Amendnient limitations: 
For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least 
must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask 
whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. Ifboth 
inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the 
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, 
and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve 
that interest.23o 
merce, Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness of the House Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce, 103d Congo 196 (1994) (statement of William Nealon, Vice President & 
General Counsel of Telectronics Pacing Systems) (In light of recent preemption 
decisions, "we firmly believe that tort reform has already arrived for medical device 
manufacturers."). 
228. See supra note 20. For the FDA's response to various and sundry other 
constitutional arguments, including "takings" and due process challenges to the 
restriction on the use of brand-names, see, e.g., 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,550-56, 
44,428-29 (1996); see also Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749, 758-59 (D.C. 
Cir. 1977) (holding that a corrective advertising cease and desist order did not 
constitute a taking). 
229. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
230. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. The four-part analysis in Central Hudson 
was reaffirmed recently in the Court's decision to overturn a prohibition on the dis­
closure of alcohol content in the labeling of beer. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 
115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995); see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 
1495, 1508-10 (1996) (plurality) (striking down state prohibition against alcohol price 
advertising as unconstitutional under the Central Hudson test, and suggesting an 
even stricter test for scrutinizing such outright prohibitions on commercial speech); 
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In other words, assuming that the speech does not relate to 
some unlawful activity and is not inherently misleading, the 
government may restrict commercial speech only to achieve a 
substantial interest, and then only to the extent necessary. 
A Government Interest in Controlling Tobacco Advertising 
The Central Hudson test asks first whether the speech in 
question is false or relates to some illegal activity; if so, it is not 
protected by the First Amendment and may be banned altogeth­
er.231 The government has not suggested that existing labeling 
and advertising of tobacco products is false, and tobacco compa­
nies have refrained from expressly urging underage use. None­
theless, the FDA could take the position that certain types of 
tobacco advertising encourage unlawful use or are inherently 
misleading. Curiously, in defending the constitutionality of its 
proposed restrictions on tobacco advertising, the FDA did not 
initially argue that such advertising promotes an unlawful activ­
ity or is inherently misleading.232 In the preamble accompany­
ing the final regulations, the Agency suggested but did not rely 
upon this argument.233 
id. at 1522 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) ("Because Rhode Island's regula­
tion fails even the less stringent standard set out in Central Hudson, nothing here 
requires adoption of a new analysis for the evaluation of commercial speech regula­
tion."). . 
231. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566; see also United States v. Edge Broad. 
Co., 509 U.S. 418, 426-30 (1993) (upholding a federal statute restricting broadcast 
advertising of lotteries if unlawful within a state); Village of Hoffman Estates v. 
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 509 U.S. 418, 426-30 (1982) (rejecting First Amend­
ment challenge to ordinance guidelines which regulate the sale of drug paraphernalia 
within a certain proximity of any literature encouraging the use of illegal drugs); 
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388 
(1973) ("We have no doubt that a newspaper constitutionally could be forbidden to 
publish a want ad proposing a sale of narcotics or soliciting prostitutes."). 
232. See 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314, 41,354 (1995) ("The Central Hudson analysis begins 
with the second prong."). 
233. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,470-72; cf. Vincent Blasi & Henry P. Monaghan, The 
First Amendment and Cigarette Advertising, 256 JAMA 502, 506 (1986) (arguing that 
cigarette advertising is deceptive and misleading); Kenneth L. Polin, Argument for 
the Ban of Tobacco Advertising: A First Amendment Analysis, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
99, 113 (1988) (arguing that tobacco product advertising is inherently misleading and 
can thus be banned without violating constitutional protections for commercial 
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Assuming that the commercial speech is neither false nor 
misleading, the second prong of the Central Hudson test asks 
whether the asserted government interest in enacting the regu­
lation is substantial.234 The FDA simply notes that it has a sig­
nificant interest in protecting the public health by reducing 
smoking among youngsters and proceeds to the third prong of 
the analysis.235 The government undoubtedly has a legitimate 
interest in reducing the number of minors who begin smoking, 
both to protect the health of those individuals and to reduce the 
cost to society in caring for them when they suffer from tobacco­
related illnesses.236 
B. The Nexus Between Means and Ends 
Assuming the existence of a substantial government inter­
est, the next question is whether the regulation directly advanc­
es the asserted interests.237 Although the FDA takes comfort in 
the Supreme Court's willingness in one recent case to accept 
anecdotal evidence in support of a restriction on commercial 
speech,238 the Court generally has been reluctant to allow in-
speech). 
234. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566; see also Posadas de Puerto Rico 
Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986) (holding that the 
legislature's interest in promoting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens by 
reducing their demand for gambling is substantial and justifies the regulation of 
gambling advertising). 
235. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,472-73. 
236. See, e.g., id. at 44,399; Jane E. Brody, Study in Massachusetts Finds That 
Cigarettes Stunt Lungs of Young Smokers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1996, at A8. To the 
extent that the FDA asserts a collateral goal of reducing consumption by adults 
exposed to the same types of advertising, the proposed restrictions may be harder to 
justify under the remaining prongs of the Central Hudson test. See 44 Liquormart, 
Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1508 (1996) (plurality) ("The First Amendment 
directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the 
dark for what the government perceives to be their own good."); see also id. at 1516 
(Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (concluding that such an interest is "per se 
illegitimate"). 
237. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 (explaining that "the regulatory 
technique must be in proportion to that interest" and "must be designed carefully to 
achieve the State's goal"). 
238. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,474; Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 
2371, 2377:78 (1995) ("The anecdotal record mustered by the Bar is noteworthy for 
its breadth and detail . . . . In any event, we do not read our case law to require 
that empirical data come to us accompanied by a surfeit of background informa­
"."J",,-~~~ ~ 
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terference with protected speech on the basis of such tenuous 
connections.239 In Rubin u. Coors Brewing CO.,240 for example, 
the Court emphasized that the government shoulders the burden 
of showing that a restriction advances its asserted interests "in a 
direct and material way."241 
The FDA has gathered a wealth of evidence regarding the 
association between promotion and the use of cigarettes and 
smokeless tobacco products by minors.242 The Agency also has 
collected evidence, including reports of success in other coun­
tries, to demonstrate that advertising restrictions reduce con­
sumption.243 Thus, it concludes, the restrictions directly ad­
vance the government's legitimate interest in protecting public 
health.244 The Agency's restrictions on advertising (such as 
text-only format, the ban on promotional items, and restrictions 
on sponsorship) seem likely to reduce demand for cigarettes 
among the adolescent population to some extent,245 though 
tion."}. The Court was sharply divided on this and other aspects of the case. See 
Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2384 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Our cases require some­
thing more than a few pages of self-serving and unsupported statements by the 
State to demonstrate that a regulation directly and materially advances the 
elimination of a real harm when the State seeks to suppress truthful and 
nondeceptive speech."). 
239. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569 (noting that the link between the 
advertising prohibition and the utility's rate structure was tenuous, even if there 
was an "immediate connection" between the advertising at issue and the demand for 
electricity: "[T]he Commission's laudable concern over the equity and efficiency of 
appellant's rates does not provide a constitutionally adequate reason for restricting 
protected speech."); see also Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993) (explain­
ing that the government's burden is not satisfied by "mere speculation or conjec­
ture"). 
240. 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995). 
241. See Rubin, 115 S. Ct. at 1592; 44 Liquormart, Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1509-10 
(plurality) (finding inadequate evidence to support the state's claim that its ban on 
alcohol price advertising would promote temperance). 
242. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,488-89 (summarizing the evidence); id. at 44,466-69, 
44,475-88, 44,494-95 (detailing the evidence). 
243. See id. at 44,489-93. 
244. See id. at 44,495. 
245. See Erica Swecker, Note, Joe Camel: Will ·Old Joe" Survive?, 36 WM. & 
MARy L. REV. 1519, 1522-25 (1995); Timothy Noah, Study Says Minors Respond 
More to Cigarette Ads Than Do Adults, WAIL ST. J., Apr. 4, 1996, at B8 (summariz­
ing a new study finding that advertising influenced adolescent smokers' preferences 
among cigarette brands). But see 44 Liquormart, Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1509-10 (plu­
rality) (discounting the value of evidence concerning the purported link between price 
advertising and the level of alcohol consumption). 
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forced reductions in the billions of dollars spent annually by the 
tobacco industry for advertising could lead to greater price com­
petition, which might increase purchasing by minors.246 
Finally, even if the advertising restrictions would be effec­
tive in reducing adolescent tobacco use, the regulations seem 
vulnerable under the final prong of the Central Hudson test,247 
which requires that a restriction be no more extensive than nec­
essary to achieve the government's goal.246 The preamble in­
cludes a detailed explanation to justify each of its advertising 
limitations.249 Nonetheless, some of the FDA's restrictions fail 
to differentiate between advertisements directed at minors, in 
whose welfare the government asserts the substantial interest in 
this context, and advertisements directed at adults.250 More­
246. See Daniel Helberg, Note, Butt Out: An Analysis of the FDA's Proposed Re­
strictions on Cigarette Advertising Under the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 29 LoY. 
LA L. REV. 1219, 1260 (1996). The FDA dismisses this possibility with little discus­
sion. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,511. It concedes elsewhere that the industry will save 
money but speculates that the unspent advertising budgets will be redirected as 
increased dividends for shareholders or investments in other product lines. See id. at 
44,570. Perhaps the money will be absorbed by mounting legal bills. 
247. See Helberg, supra note 246, at 1258-66; David Cole, Muzzling Joe Camel, 
LEGAL TIMES, May 6, 1996, at 22; cf. Lars Noah & Barbara A. Noah, Liberating 
Commercial Speech: Product Labeling Controls and the First Amendment, 47 FLA. L. 
REv. 63, 99-104 (1995) (evaluating the FDA's food labeling restrictions on health 
claims); Rosanna Tainbunni, Tough Restrictions on Tobacco Ads Struck Down By 
High Court, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 1995, at B2 (discussing Canadian decision). 
248. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 
1510 n.13 (1993). 
[W]hile we have rejected the "least-restrictive-means" test for judging restric­
tions on commercial speech, so too have we rejected mere rational basis re­
view . . . . [I]f there are numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives 
to the restriction on commercial speech, that is certainly a relevant consider­
ation in determining whether the "fit" between ends and means is reasonable. 
In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982); see also Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
249. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,500-37, 44,610. The FDA repeatedly explains that 
adults will continue to have access to informational advertising through the text-only 
format (and to unrestricted advertising in adult publications and establishments) bu', 
that children will no longer be exposed to appealing colors and imagery. For an 
argument that such restrictions violate the Constitution, see Martin H. Redish, 
Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REV. 589, 625-30, 638 
(1996). According to Professor Redish, only the restrictions on tobacco advertising in 
the vicinity of schools or playgrounds pass First Amendment muster. See id. at 608. 
250. Cf. Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989) (invalidating re­
striction on phone-sex services that "has the invalid effect of limiting the content of 
adult telephone conversations to that which is suitable for children to hear"); Penn 
Adver., Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 63 F.3d 1318, 1325-26 (4th Cir. 1995) (rejecting 
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over, the government should consider less restrictive alterna­
tives, such as legislation to increase taxes on tobacco products or 
even more stringent restrictions on access.251 In fact, lawmak­
ers have proposed major tax increases on the sale of cigarettes, 
which would reduce sales (especially among youngsters) without 
infringing on constitutionally protected speech.252 
The FDA originally had argued, among other things, that 
the government's greater power to ban tobacco products includes 
the lesser power to regulate extensively the advertising of these 
products,253 and that it has "greater leeway" to regulate 
"speech with regard to socially harmful activities."254 In its lat­
est commercial speech decision, however, the Supreme Court 
soundly rejected these arguments.255 Recognizing the weak­
nesses of its initial defense, the Agency included in the final 
First Amendment challenge to a city's prohibition on all cigarette billboard advertis­
ing justified as a way to reduce underage smoking), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996), 
reinstated, 1996 U.S. App. L~S 29462 (4th Cir. Nov. 13, 1996). 
251. See 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1510 ("[H]igher [alcohol] prices can be 
maintained either by direct regulation or by increased taxation."); id. at 1522 
(O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). 
252. See John Schmeltzer & Michael Arndt, Under Siege in Cigarette Wars, 
Tobacco Titans Counterattack, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 25, 1994, at 1. Commentators on the' 
proposed tax increase note that, because minors have less disposable income than 
adults, there will be a greater reduction in overall tobacco consumption by minors. 
See David Bourne et al., The Effect of Raising State and Federal Tobacco Tax, 38 J. 
FAM. PRAc. 300 (1994); see also 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314, 41,324 (1995) ("Young people, 
who generally have little disposable income, can be particularly sensitive to the price 
of cigarettes and may choose not to smoke as the price increases."); cf. 61 Fed. Reg. 
at 44,453 ("The agency cannot act on these comments as it lacks the authority to 
levy taxes or mandate prices.") .. 
253. See 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,355 (citing Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tour­
ism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 345-46 (1986». 
254. Id. (claiming that Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1595 (1995), is 
not contrary). 
255. See 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1511-13 ("The reasoning in Posadas does 
support the State's argument, but, on reflection, we are now persuaded that Posadas 
erroneously performed the First Amendment analysis," including its significant 
deference to a state legislature's choice of means, its "greater-includes-the-Iesser" 
reasoning, and its supposed "vice" exception.); id. at 1513 ("As the entire Court 
apparently now agrees, the statements in the Posadas opinion on which Rhode 
Island relies are no longer persuasive."); id. at 1522 (O'Connor, J., concurring in 
judgment) ("The closer look that we have required since Posadas comports better 
with the purpose of the analysis set out in Central Hudson . .••"); see also Coors, 
115 S. Ct. at 1589-91 n.2 (rejecting government's suggestion that it has "broader 
latitude to regulate speech that promotes socially harmful activities"); City of 
Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 763 (1988). 
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preamble a more sophisticated response to these constitutional 
objections.256 Although one may quibble with some of the ad­
vertising restrictions, a reviewing court will probably sustain 
their constitutionality on the strength of the evidentiary record 
amassed by the FDA in this case. 
C. Special Concerns About Industry-Funded Counteradvertising 
The proposed requirement that the tobacco industry spend 
$150 million each year to broadcast anti-smoking messages 
poses additional First Amendment difficulties. The FDA, origi­
nally taking refuge in language from the statute's restricted 
device provisions, concluded that "an educational program about 
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products is a restriction that is 
necessary because of the 'potentiality for harmful effect' of [to­
bacco] products."257 The Agency asserted that a national educa­
tional campaign is necessary to counteract the effects of the 
"appealing images" associated with smoking which have been 
perpetuated in the tobacco industry's advertising campaigns, 
and it summarized the evidence from independent studies to 
demonstrate the likely effectiveness of an industry-sponsored 
campaign.256 But a requirement that the tobacco industry en­
256. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,496·500. 
257. See 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,350. Educational campaigns sometimes are mentioned 
as a possible alternative to a restriction on commercial speech, but courts assume a 
government·sponsored campaign and, in any event, can only speculate about its 
likely effectiveness. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1510 ("Even educational 
campaigns focused on the problems of. . . drinking might prove to be more ef­
fective."); see also id. at 1522 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). 
258. See 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,326·27; see also 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,538·39, 44,590; 
supra note 149 (describing the success of such programs in California and Mas· 
sachusetts). Some critics believe that the approach could, however, prove to be 
counterproductive. See Carlo DiClemente, Will the Regulations Work?, HEALTH L. 
NEWS, Sept. 1995, at 6 (arguing that "societal efforts must avoid increasing attention 
to cigarettes, even if in a negative manner, or creating restrictions that would 
increase black market demand. Efforts to curb smoking . . . can have a reverse 
effect by creating a rebellious, recalcitrant cohort of smokers."); see also Robert S. 
Adler & R. David Pittle, Cajolery or Command: Are Education Campaigns an Ade· 
quate Substitute for Regulation?, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 159, 162·64 (1984); Lawrence O. 
Gostin & Allan M. Brandt, Criteria for Evaluating a Ban on the Advertisement of 
Cigarettes: Balancing Public Health Benefits with Constitutional Burdens, 269 JAMA 
904, 906 (1993); Alan Schwartz, Views of Addiction and the Duty to Warn, 75 VA. L. 
REV. 509, 556·57 (1989). 
61 1996] Tobacco Regulations 
gage in such counter-speech, ostensibly to correct misleading im­
pressions from past promotional activities, contravenes the 
Constitution's special distrust of "forced" speech. 
The First Amendment has been interpreted to include not 
only a right of free speech but also the right to refrain from 
speech which is abhorrent to the speaker.259 The Supreme 
Court has refused, for instance, to uphold orders requiring a 
corporation to associate itself with speech which the corporation 
may disagree with.260 The FDA's proposal was not just a limi­
tation on labeling or advertising; instead, it would force the 
tobacco industry to speak. Rather than imposing a company­
specific requirement or limitation to correct an identifiable past 
violation, the proposal sought to appropriate millions of dollars 
for an advertising campaign that would require industry en­
dorsement of positions which the industry opposes. The First 
Amendment protects freedom of thought against state action, 
and this freedom includes both the right to speak freely and the 
right to refrain from speaking.261 
In defending its original proposal, the FDA never directly 
acknowledged this forced speech concern, although it cited deci­
sions upholding "corrective" advertising orders imposed by other 
259. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977) (holding 
that employees could not be compelled to pay union dues); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 
U.S. 705, 713 (1977) <holding that a state may not constitutionally require a motor­
ist to display motto on license plate which conflicts with motorist's political, religious 
or moral beliefs); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. I, 11-21 
(1986) (holding that a public utilities commission could not, under the First Amend­
ment, require a utility to include in its billing envelopes a third-party newsletter 
containing assertions regarding energy use with which the utility might disagree). 
260. See Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 15-17 (noting that, "[w]ere the government 
freely able to compel corporate speakers to propound political messages with which 
they disagree, this [First Amendment] protection would be empty"); see also Interna­
tional Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 72 (2d Cir. 1996) (granting prelim­
inary injunctions against enforcement of state law requiring the disclosure of rBST 
use in the labeling of dairy products because "[t]he statute in question indisputably 
requires [manufacturers] to speak when they would rather not"); Wileman Bros. & 
Elliott, Inc. v. Espy, 58 F.3d 1367, 1380 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[A]1though we agree that 
the Secretary [of Agriculture] has a substantial interest in promoting peaches and 
nectarines, we hold that forced contributions to pay for generic advertising programs 
contravene the First Amendment rights of the handlers."), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 
1875 (1996). 
261. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1519-22 
(1995); Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795-98 (1988); Miami 
Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-57 (1974). 
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agencies.262 Although courts have upheld limited corrective ad­
vertising orders in the past,263 the Agency's proposed plan far 
exceeds a traditional FTC cease and desist requirement.2M No 
agency has ever successfully mandated corrective advertising on 
an industry-wide basis. The FDA pointed to an educational re­
quirement for hearing aids as an example of a previous compa­
ny-financed educational message/55 but hearing aid manufac­
turers must distribute to purchasers only an informative bro­
chure with their products,266 a requirement that differs little 
from typical labeling regulations.267 By comparison, an educa­
tional campaign cannot possibly target only potential adolescent 
users of a particular company's tobacco products. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The FDA's goal of substantially reducing the rate of tobacco 
use among adolescents is laudable, but the Agency has failed to 
262. See 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,356. Although the final regulations do not include 
this requirement, the Agency explained that it would use its "notification" authority 
to order companies to undertake some counteradvertising.· See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,538 
("Because the education campaign will not be a requirement of this final rule, the 
agency need not respond to the many comments that it received ••••"). The FDA 
nevertheless briefly responded to some of the comments, though not with regard to 
the constitutional issues. 
263. See, e.g., National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FrC, 570 F.2d 157, 164 (7th 
Cir. 1977) (modifying overbroad corrective advertising order); cf. Warner-Lambert Co. 
v. FrC, 562 F.2d 749, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (upholding FrC corrective advertising 
order where a manufacturer had made false and misleading statements about the 
efficacy of its mouthwash product, Listerine, in the prevention, cure, treatment, and 
mitigation of colds and severe sore throats). 
264. The FDA's broad rulemaking approach differs significantly from the FrC's 
case-by-case adjudication of misleading advertising claims. See Richard S. Higgins & 
Fred S. McChesney, Truth and Consequences: The Federal Trade Commission's Ad 
Substantiation Program, in PuBLIC CHOICE AND REGULATION: A VIEW FROM INSIDE 
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 181, 182-84 (Robert J. Mackay et al. eds., 1987); 
Arthur Best, Controlling False Advertising: A Comparative Study of Public Regula­
tion, Industry Self-Policing, and Private Litigation, 20 GA. L. REV. 1, 16-20 (1985). 
265. See 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,351. 
266. See 21 C.F.R. § 801.420(cX3) (1996). The Agency argues that it is impossible 
to set up a regulatory scheme which would involve only the dissemination of limited, 
targeted information to those adolescents who are susceptible to taking up smoking 
and that, therefore, a nationwide campaign is necessary. See 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,351. 
267. See Noah & Noah, supra note 247, at 105-07 (discussing possible constitu­
tional objections to product warning label requirements). 
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appreciate (or admit) the limitations of its statutory authority 
and some of the other weaknesses of its regulations. The initia­
tive still may succeed in prompting a more moderate legislative 
response to the problem. In the meantime, however, the FDA 
may have done itself irreparable harm and diverted valuable 
time and resources from matters that it clearly does have re­
sponsibility to control. 
